ANTHROPOLOGICAL QUARTERLY

CONTENTS

MODERN COMMUNITY STUDIES IN THE CIRCUM-MEDITERRANEAN AREA

(Special Issue)

The Catholic University of America Press
WASHINGTON 17, D. C.

SOCIAL CLASS IN A FRENCH VILLAGE[1]

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The concept of social class is central to the discussion of the structure of any modern European community, for it concerns the differentiation of its members in terms of superiority and inferiority, the ties of reciprocity between them and the bond of solidarity based upon equality. Yet there is little agreement as to the status or proper usage of the term among social scientists and where there is it tends to lie in the acceptance of a set of simple assumptions regarding "stratification" which nevertheless remain highly questionable in certain social contexts. Most writers today appear to prefer as the criteria by which they define social classes or "strata" the standards of differentiation of the people themselves—the ethnographical view of class, so that the word is used as a descriptive term referring only to the ways in which people view themselves as differentiated. It tends, nonetheless, to be assumed that, even though the picture of the persons within the system varies according to the position within it of the viewer, it can at least be viewed by the social scientist as a single system, in the sense that the same criteria of inferiority or superiority are accepted by the whole society; that it is unnecessary to delineate the society within which the system operates; and that there is only one system of class in any one society, that the same values pertain to a class system throughout. It is thought thus to be possible to establish a single system of stratification by asking the inhabitants to rate their neighbours in terms of class or prestige without always examining what are the perceptual categories by which they will do this, nor whether they are the same in every instance, nor whether this is asking them to perform an operation which they find necessary and natural in the process of their normal lives or an exotic sociological quiz.

I have already shown, in the instance of a Spanish town (Pitt-Rivers, 1954) how the nature of social class may change according to the position of the individual community-member within the national structure and according to the social context, but

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[1] An early version of this paper was offered at the American Anthropological Association Meeting in Chicago, December 1958.

there was at any rate, in spite of the different connotations given
to class relations by the different participants, a rough general
agreement in that society as to who was superior socially to whom.
In this instance of a French village even this basic agreement is
missing and the implications of this for a discussion of social class
are far-reaching. In the case of the Spanish town the divergent
social norms were related to the closely integrated plebeian com-
munity on the one hand and to the structure of the region on the
other. The same kind of distinction can be made here: the
class system relating to the traditional structure of the village is
not the same system as that relating to the outside world of the
modern national urban society.

Yet, while it was possible to interpret the data from the Span-
ish town in terms of the function of the upper class within both
the system of local patronage and the structure of the state, the
"national-culture" element within the French village exercises
no patronage and so far from representing the leadership of the
community constitutes for its leaders a despised element. It fulfills
no function in terms of the village community and in order to
explain its presence it is necessary to look for connections wider
and more complex than those contained within the social struc-
ture of the local community.

The cultural distinction between the two elements, a concomi-
tant of the different values of the two systems, is underscored
by a linguistic distinction which enables us to see the problem
with greater clarity, though it is not suggested that the fortuities
of linguistic history could be put forward as a cause of such a
situation. On the contrary, it is suggested that comparable
structural situations may well be found where only much less
obvious linguistic markers exist.

<p style="text-align:center">*   *   *</p>

France is, or rather once was, divided into two distinct lin-
guistic halves: the land of the *langue d'oïl* and the land of the
langue d'oc, and to these two languages there corresponded two
distinct cultures. The *langue d'oc* blossomed earlier than the
langue d'oïl and gave us the literature of the troubadours but it
was the people of the latter who won the political hegemony of
France, and their language became French; the capital of the
country Paris and not Toulouse nor Avignon.

Since then, the language frontier of the *langue d'oc* has receded not only geographically, but "vertically" as the sociologists would put it. That is to say, in the later Middle Ages and up till the mid-fifteenth century the upper class spoke *langue d'oc* ordinarily and for formal purposes Latin, while the population spoke only *langue d'oc* which was taught as a written language in the schools. (Pansier, 1925, I, p. 38.) By the mid-twentieth century the upper and urban classes speak only French, the only language taught in school, and the peasants are bilingual. At the same time the *langue d'oc* has been lost in the large towns and centres of communication which speak only French. Rather than view the matter in terms of class, it is better to view it in terms of community and function. The function of government was the first to be taken over by the *langue d'oïl* and the hegemony of the French crown corresponded to the imposition of the French language as the language of the ruler. Subsequently, where Latin is eliminated, it gives way to French, not to *langue d'oc,* in the context of the law or of religion and education. Local administrations and legal proceedings move from *langue d'oc* to French though not without a considerable variation according to area. For example, in spite of an ordinance of the crown of 1539 that notaries should keep their minutes in French, one finds notarial acts in the archives of Cahors written in *langue d'oc* as late as the end of the sixteenth century. (Dobelman, 1940, p. 3.)

Langue d'oc continued to be spoken by the educated after they had ceased to write it but once it ceased to be taught in the schools its orthography was lost. At the same time a quantity of gallicisms were introduced which result in the eighteenth century in the formation of the bastard language known as *"patois"* which remained the spoken language of the population. Down to the mid-nineteenth century French was not much spoken even in the towns. (Arnaud et Morin, 1920, xxii.) However, the great increase in the number of public servants and the tendency not to post them to their native regions, increased emigration and reimmigration, compulsory military service and a constant campaign against the *patois* in the schools, brought about a further change. The industry and commerce of the nineteenth century grew up speaking French, while agriculture remained the sphere of *patois,* with the result that the language dichotomy

came to approximate to the dichotomy between town and country, and since langued'oc-speaking France is above all a land of small peasant farmers, in many social situations between rich and poor. Social superiority was accorded to the modern, the urban, the French, and the attempt to revive the language and culture of the langued'oc, the "félibrige," remained a purely literary movement without influence over the populace.

Though the decline of the *patois* has continued steadily since the mid-nineteenth century and the urban and bourgeois have virtually lost their knowledge of it, it is still spoken in rural areas in the appropriate context. The entire population is French-speaking with the exception of certain ancient persons living on isolated farms whose frailty has confined them for years to the company of their family and who have forgotten it. At the other end of the scale, the younger members of the professional classes know virtually none, though the older tradespeople in the market towns can usually manage a smattering of it. Even so they can barely be considered bilingual. Yet *patois* is still the language of agriculture and of the market and in the *forail* (the agricultural fairground) scarcely a word of French is spoken save by the occasional dealer from the North. For the peasants it is the language of the local, as opposed to national tradition, of proverbs and invective, of merry-making and salty jokes whose humour, it is asserted, is lost if translated into French, of intimacy and the family. Old men can still remember how they felt lost when they went into the army and had to speak French all the time, and how, if they spoke *patois,* the other soldiers, northerners or city folk, jeered at them, shouting "en voilà encore un qui mange de la paille!" ("here's another straw-eater!") and so forth. In contrast to the spontaneous world of the patois, the world of French is that of formal relations, and a striking difference in demeanour is often observable between the two contexts.

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Magnac is a village of 450 inhabitants, situated in largely fertile but rather broken country between the limestone plateau of the Quercy and the Massif Central. It had a larger population fifty years ago like most of the villages of this region and earlier still, before the phylloxera killed the vines, it was much larger

again. In consequence of the decline in numbers, the size of land-holdings has increased and the average family holding is somewhere around 60 acres. The largest is 140 acres and the smallest entirely supporting a family is 30. In addition, there are many smaller properties which only partially support a household. These belong to artisans, retired people and people who work elsewhere and rent them out in anticipation of their own retirement or who supplement their pension by keeping a flock of sheep.

The village lies in a valley overlooked by its church, a fortified romanesque edifice once part of the defenses, and by the chateau which was inhabited by a noble family of the region down to the first world war. They were one of the last of the local nobility to disappear from the scene.

The southwest of France has an ancient tradition of emigration dating from before the time when modern conditions accentuated the impoverishment of its agriculture. The younger sons of noble families were traditionally military adventurers. The small and arid department where Magnac is situated furnished two of Napoleon's marshals. The culinary art of its inhabitants has made it famous and has provided a profitable living for a number of its sons in the restaurant business in Paris. Other than as waiters, café and restaurant-keepers, they also go to Paris and Toulouse in search of a more generous wage than local employers can afford to pay. They are frequently employed in the Paris Metro (subway). These emigrants do not willingly sever their connections with the village as a rule. In this, they are similar to their neighbours of the Auvergne and the newspaper *"Auvergnat de Paris"* covers the area of Magnac, giving a weekly account of every recent event of social importance, village by village, for the benefit of the metropolitan exiles. They frequently come to spend their summer vacations with relatives in the village and some maintain a house there for the purpose, to which they will perhaps return when they receive their pension and retire. Others whom ill-health has forced to retire early have returned prematurely to their birth-place.

In addition to these retired persons there are others who have come to spend their years of retirement here because the climate is agreeable and because houses in this depopulated area can be

bought for very little, and life is not expensive. Furthermore, there are persons who fled to this area in front of the German invasion in 1940 and, having no reason to go elsewhere, they remained. Pensions and part-time agriculture supply the livelihood of these people, but there is also a small number of persons living here who work in a brick factory four miles away.

All these people live in the village of Magnac and its immediate environs. They constitute something of a group, or perhaps one should say "faction." In opposition to them are those who have never left the soil of their fathers, the farmers.

The farms, very ancient and picturesque buildings surrounded by their out-houses and vegetable garden, are scattered over the territory of the *commune*. They are inhabited, in the majority of cases by their owners who work from dawn till dusk and go to the village only on Sunday mornings for Mass and shopping, or during the week to visit the blacksmith with an animal. Their children, however, go down daily to school. There are two grocery stores though there is barely enough business for one, for the farmers make many of their purchases in the local towns where they attend the markets. The market is no longer held at Magnac, though the building remains and serves as a covered parking lot for hay-carts in summer and for the still in autumn.

Each farm is a family exploitation, but families are small and occasional labour scarce. The difference between wages which the farmers here consider that they can afford to pay and the wages paid in richer areas or in industry is very considerable, so that those who intend to seek permanent employment go elsewhere. The labour force of each farm consists of a potential elderly couple in semi-retirement, the farmer and his wife, and their children of whom only one will remain to marry and inherit, an occasional transient semi-skilled employee or exceptionally, a permanent employee in the shape of an elderly bachelor or widower who has preferred to remain upon his native land. Wage-labour by the day is performed irregularly by one or two retired persons and occasionally by one of the minor members of a poorer farming household.

The inhabitants of the farms are sometimes referred to as "les estrangers," the people who live outside, but they do not constitute a group as such and they are certainly not outsiders in any

but the geographical sense. As a social group they are "les propriétaires," a group of whom one lives in the village. They are the guardians of tradition, very conservative in their ways. A few of them still wear the black peasant smock and black felt hat when they come to the village on Sundays. Their wives wear the traditional black straw hat.

Their lives are entirely ordered by the business of making a living from the land and the tradition of polyculture dies hard. "Produce it yourself, then you don't have to pay for it" was once their guiding economic principle and remains their preference. Economically, farming is a hard fight. Prices have been going steadily against the farmer since the war, while taxes, social insurance and the cost of industrial products have been going up. They pay out as little as possible, make their own wine in many cases and all of them make their own alcohol. They work on Sundays during the rush season and save every penny. Their relaxations are few: they go rarely to the entertainments offered in the towns; they attend the "FÊTE" of Magnac but only the young go to the FÊTES of other villages. The threshing on different farms provides a day of work which ends in a feast, and visiting is done largely in connection with agricultural affairs and in particular with the arrangements of reciprocal services. People visit their kin and friends on Sundays if they live near by, but only the life crises of close kin take them further afield. Among neighbours there exists, or rather existed, a traditional reunion for the long winter's evenings when friends would be invited to come to a "dénoisillage," the shelling and peeling of walnuts, at which food and drink were offered and traditional stories were told. Otherwise, Sundays, feastdays and funerals gather the village community together. The visit, monthly or more often, to the market in the local towns ranks as an important social event and an occasion — the only one — where this society unites on a more than local basis in the context of its dominant value, agriculture.

A clearly defined notion of ranking exists among these people which relates to the size and prosperity of their farms. The symbols of this system are all in terms of production, not of consumption: first of all, the value of the property; and secondly, the value of the *cheptel,* that is the equipment and stock, are

significant, but the ability to produce of the individual farmer, to produce quality and quantity, is also a title to prestige. Since the market is where the produce is compared and admired, it has, in addition to its function as a meeting-place, that of a testing-ground of a man's worth. Prestige does not attach to consumption patterns, and the differences noticeable here such as washing machines and station-wagon automobiles which are undoubted signs of affluence, are, considering their utility in terms of time and labour saving, more properly classed as part of the *cheptel.* Apart from their pure utility they enjoy the same kind of prestige-value as a new tractor.

Between farmers there exists a network of reciprocal services which are never admitted to be reciprocal but are couched in the idiom of disinterested neighbourly duty. These concern the loan of animals and machinery as well as services, and of reciprocal gifts of produce. A certain number of share-cropping arrangements are made, mainly between the farmers and the agricultural members of the village who take on the labour of weeding and harvesting a root crop in return for a third of the produce.

Until recently these people held a virtual monopoly of political power. All the municipal councillors came from among their number. The mayor was quite simply the largest land-owner, and the councillors were all *propriétaires,* even though the land of one was so unproductive that he lived miserably. The village-dwellers lumped them together under the title of "les gros," the men of substance. Another characteristic of the councillors was that they were all elderly. The mayor was over seventy, the youngest was a grandfather. This was the traditional system, a gerontocracy.

It may seem curious that these old men were able to dominate the political scene so completely, for their families outnumber the village-dwellers only by 2:1. However, in municipal and syndical elections there are no party politics; no one stands as anything but himself, and there are normally only the same number of candidates as there are seats. The gerontocrats decide among themselves who is to stand and no one else thinks it worth while to stand uninvited and in opposition. He would be certain to be outvoted and would be much criticized by the

majority as one who wished to sow discord in village affairs.

In national politics the division between the two elements is clearly marked; 20% of the suffrage goes to the Communist candidate and this is known to be the village vote less certain elements, mainly female. The strongest party was traditionally the M.R.P., but it is not a vote which is profoundly attached nor is there any party organization in the commune. At the election in January, 1956 Magnac's figures showed a landslide to the left and the SFIO candidate gained an absolute majority. This was not on account of any change in Magnac's way of thinking regarding either politics or religion but simply because a doctor known for his devotion to his patients among the farmers and for his capacity in the politics of the region presented himself on an SFIO ticket. Other than the expression of his belief in the greatness of France in which he recalled the sacrifice made by his electors in two world wars, and his determination that the war in Algeria must be stopped (he did not suggest how) his speech to the electors of Magnac dealt uniquely with local issues concerning the welfare of the commune. The doctor's success reflected his clear understanding of social realities.

Let us take a look at the village element. They do not speak *patois*, either because they come from further north (retired people) or because, having gone to work as young men, they have forgotten how to speak it. The farmers who are bilingual have fairly clearly defined contexts where one language or the other is spoken, but the language for the matters which they value and the contexts where they amuse themselves, is *patois*. For them French is the language of national affairs, not community affairs.

The values of the village-dwellers are urban values. They are accustomed to the notion of fixed incomes, and their prestige rating is done in terms of consumption not production. They buy things, they do not produce them, and they look to the city and urban life for their ideals. It is very difficult to speak of "they" for they are much less homogeneous than the farmers. All who live in the village do not sympathise with "the village element," while some of the younger members of the poorer farming families do so. These are in many cases in the process of detaching themselves from the land and are seen a year or two later to have left altogether for permanent employment else-

where. The young of the village-dwellers work in the local town to which they go on low-powered motorcycles.

There is one type among the village dwellers whom one could describe as belonging to both factions: the artisans. Though they are no more than a few households they are important as the only group which belongs to both factions. They speak *patois* freely with their clients from outside the village, and they are born and bred in the commune. Indeed they are among the most traditional people in some ways for they are all that remains of a once prosperous and numerous element whose economic role has been usurped to a large extent by the shops and workshops of the market-town. Their sympathies and aspirations are with the village faction, however.

I speak of faction because, in spite of a number of kinship ties between the two elements, a deep distrust and even hatred exists, which cannot be understood without looking outside the village at its place within the nation.

France is governed from Paris and the laws are made there which rule the whole country. The leadership in commerce and the arts, in fashions and in the intellectual world is centered in Paris. The ambitious young man must leave his natal village and go to town if he wishes to escape from the slowly increasing apathy of an improverished countryside. Success more than the acquisition of a few extra acres means success in the national world of France. This is so in any social class.

Such of the traditional country gentry and ancient bourgeoisie as remain live mostly elsewhere and come to their properties only for the summer or in old age. Their occupations oblige them to live in Paris or Toulouse where many have entered the liberal professions. The summer visitor is always socially superior to a person of the locality who follows the same calling, or pretends to the same rank. The aristocrat who lives in Paris refers to his noble country-dwelling neighbour as *un petit genre amusant que produit la province française* (an amusing little product of the French provinces). The doctor's wife who lives in Toulouse is at pains to correct the impression that she is the wife of a local doctor. The urban classes all regard the peasants with a patronising and amused superiority.

Within the area there are to be found two or three men who

have made good in Paris in the café business and have retired to buy a farm in their native land. They have spent money making modernised exploitations which local farmers admire while at the same time asserting that they are quite uneconomical and require to be supported by the receipts of the café. This is almost certainly untrue, though the owners have no interest in disputing it. These returned natives are few in number and none lives within the commune of Magnac. The farming population is the element of the community which elected to remain from earliest youth. They are aware that they are rough, that they have little verbal facility in French, that they are thought backward by the urban population, that urban people have a higher standard of living and are more sophisticated. They admire those who make good in the capital but they distrust urban people. This is the basis of their ambivalence towards national as opposed to local culture. Politically they show the same ambivalence: they are patriotic, are proud to have served their country in war. But the French nation for which they fought is one thing and the French state is another. (Cf. Wylie, 1957, chap. X.) They believe in defending themselves from interference and interference means interference from Paris.

Therefore the village faction presents something of an anomaly to them. They are sophisticated, know about national politics, do not speak "patois" and aspire to represent "national" culture. But they are only there because they tried to make good upon the national scene and failed. Their presence in Magnac is the badge of their failure. The feeling of the farmers towards them is one of distrust and contempt.

But this contempt is reciprocated. The villagers despise the farmers for their backwardness, their speech, their way of life, their reluctance to spend money. They believe themselves superior to peasants on account of their national culture and their knowledge of the world. Their lack of money is a fortuitous factor in their eyes. It makes them keenly conscious of any sign of prosperity upon the farms, but it does not make them feel inferior, only jealous. If they had the money they would know what to do with it better than those who have it.

Moreover the farmers do nothing to help them. The system of informal reciprocal services is important to the agriculture and

much stress is laid on the virtue of the neighbourly "coup de main" (helping hand). But the village-dwellers are mostly unable to reciprocate—and it is nevertheless essential to reciprocate —in the only way which the farmers would accept, that is, with labour on the farm. Therefore with the exception of the artisans there is little cooperation between the two groups. This fact gives occasion for the village faction to criticise the farmers as uncooperative and mean.

How should we explain this situation? Much has been made since Marx of the difference between rural and urban classes, (Cf. Friedmann, 1951, chap. IV.). But is one justified in speaking of an urban class which lives in the country? Should we reject altogether the concept of social class to interpret a social scene where the inhabitants nevertheless evaluate their relations in terms of superiority and inferiority, choosing the same cultural and economic criteria as the definitions of the classical theorists? Should we call in other factors; the difference in economic level between country and capital which is responsible in the first place for the presence of the village faction, the traditional xenophobia of the French peasant community, the historical enmity between the *langue d'oc* and the *langue d'oïl?* Should we indulge in the tempting comparison to a "poor white" situation?

It has been observed in a number of cases that the revolutionary rank-and-file in nineteenth century urban society was provided by the rural element which had abandoned the countryside in order to go to town to work. Here the contrary is true; it is the urban element retired from the towns which forms the rebellious force in a country village. The lack of a cultural norm for the whole community may be invoked in both instances to explain the rebellion of a nonintegrated minority. So one might argue on the local plane. But looking at the situation on a grander scale I think it is helpful to envisage the tension as one between two systems of social class, two value systems, rather than between two classes. I think this becomes clear if one considers what are the values attaching to social superiority in the case of:

(a) the farmers: they expect to find as social superiors, not Parisians, but local persons in touch with Paris, successful and wealthy on the local plane thanks to which they represent the

interests of the community on a wider scale, but whose values are nevertheless in large measure those of the country. The village-dwellers appear to them pretentious, affecting a culture to which they have no right and they represent a threat both to traditional values and also to the political unity of the commune.

(b) the village faction: they are accustomed to tolerate the existence of a superior class which embodies their cultural ideals, but does not impinge on their daily life, and to political leaders who share their values. The farmers do none of these things and yet they possess the power.

It is the clash between the expected association of cultural values with superiority—and the reality in each case, which causes the bitterness between these groups who have little, materially, to quarrel over.

But this situation is the product of time. The economic, technological and demographic impetus of the age will carry us past this moment. Under modern conditions of transportation the villages themselves are anachronistic and are disappearing in favour of the larger unit, the market-town. The gerontocrats are already a thing of the past, not on account of their age but on account of their ideas. Their children have different views. Already some of them speak only in French to their children.

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PATTERNS OF PATRONAGE IN SPAIN

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It is my intention here to define the terms patron and client as they shall be used in this article; to review the bases for the patronage system as it is found in Spain; to trace certain of its patterns; to sketch some of its outward expressions; and finally to describe some of the rules that regulate structural relationships at all status levels whereon patronage operates. My remarks are confined to Spain and, in particular, to the two provinces of Castile — the Old and the New.

When we think of the word "patron" in English we tend to dwell on the idea of sponsorship; of someone (or some organisation perhaps) who is a benefactor; of one who supports by his influence and power a "client" who stands in need of help or protection. Perhaps we drift back in time and think on struggling poets and playwrights seeking the support of a patron who could open the gate to success. Modern colloquial American has an apt term for a special form of this in the world of entertainment, namely the patron who is known as an "angel". We are all familiar with the great eccclesiastical patronage to artists of old and, some of us, now, are more conscious of equally powerful political patronage. All of us have at one time or another patronised particular stores, inns or businesses and it is not without significance that the higher we ascend the social scale in certain contexts so we become clients instead of patrons. We are clients to our lawyers who become for us our advocates—in a sense, the champions of our cause. We also become patrons, too, at times, as our own power and influence increases.

Preoccupied as we are with our modern secularism, we perhaps forget that an obsolete use of the word "patron" was reserved for reference to a tutelary god. We perhaps forget, too, that the patron in Roman times was not only a man of distinction but, under the law, was also a master who had freed his slave yet retained certain reciprocal rights over his client; the client, or ex-slave, was familiarly called by the name of his master/patron.

All these meanings, except (now) the last, are comprehended by the use of the word *patrón* in Spanish. But one must stress the

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widespread use in the religious sense particularly to mean a guardian saint of a town or village and to designate that holy figure who is reputed to have special powers in a given field. Moreover, a landlord, the proprietor of an inn or restaurant, the master or coxswain of a boat—all are *patrones*. Finally, *patrón* is employed in the sense of a pattern, a model to follow and copy.

Closely linked to the word *patrón* is its ally *padrino* * variously significant as a godfather, a second who assists at a duel, a protector, and, when in special reference to the marriage ceremony, a "best man" or groom's man. The *padrino* acts, or is expected to act in most instances, as a surrogate *patrón*.

As a working tool, therefore, I define *patrón* as ". . . someone who is regarded (and who regards himself) at once as a protector, a guide, a model to copy, and an intermediary to deal with someone else or something else more powerful than oneself, whether or not such power is imaginary or real in a single context or in all, and whether or not the advantages to be gained from his patronage are material or intangible". Likewise, a client is ". . . someone who avails himself of a patron's services and who maintains a reciprocally beneficial relationship with him". These relationships I see functioning in a system conveniently viewed in pyramidal form.

With this definition in mind we may ask what are the theoretical bases on which the patronage system rests. Without doubt the most important of these is a sense of kinship, either real or fictive. The values of the family and its unity whether in nuclear or extended form are still paramount in Spain. Godparenthood provides an exterior stimulus to these values by setting up a cherished spiritual relationship which has very real practical advantages as well. Furthermore, the model of the ideal Spanish family is still largely that of the Christian Holy Family. The most accessible member of the latter family, in terms of intercession or mediation with God, is the Virgin Mary; hence the ubiquitous recourse to her powers for she occupies a special category of her own—not only saint and Immaculate Virgin but also Mother of God.

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* So for that matter is the word *compadre* ("co-parent"); but the relationship between *compadres*—theoretically based on equality—is not specifically pertinent here.

The charismatic emanation and dispersion from those nearest God is, in part, extended to those in authority in general; to those, in fact, whose ideal role is a parental, a protective and an intermediary one. And herein lies a paradox since, although this role by definition should embrace care for the whole range of society, the fear of this charismatic quality becoming too thinly dispersed automatically restricts the growth of each patronage group and gives it an exclusiveness all its own.

With this singular regard for authority must be associated the emotional satisfaction derived from giving and receiving protection and support as well as that of special treatment in the arranging of difficult matters. This paternalistic satisfaction has peculiar force when the patron and client are closely allied by reciprocal economic ties, for example the landlord-tenant relationship, such as is the case in the so-called *jajmani* relationship in India. But its potency is more understandable among a people whose stoic consideration of this transient life comes perilously close to fatalism, whose traditional class structure of the many poor and few rich is changing but slowly, and whose dependence on moral and material support in this largely barren land of the mystics is an almost instinctive "just-in-case" type of insurance.

Hence the element of chance becomes a social force in Spain, startlingly apparent in all walks of life and expressed in one form at least by a wholesale recourse to decision by lot. Ranging from the division of the pine tree common patrimony in a Castilian village and the national selection of young men for the military draft to the fervid playing of the national lottery and the choice of subjects for examining oneself in the central school for diplomats—the results depend on the casting of lots. Luck is fickle; God's ways are mysterious. Patronage, therefore, provides one at least down-to-earth insurance policy.

Closely weaved into these other bases is a real sense of the obligations to give, to receive, and to return. There is no servility in the idea of service yet, one must add, the "do-gooder" is conspicuously absent from this society. The love of the grand gesture, the display, the courtesy formulas, the show of generosity go hand in glove with a disdain for life and an arrogant individuality—two constantly recurrent themes in the literature. They set up a complicated web of obligations which, once entered into,

are difficult to throw off. Generosity becomes a point of honour, and to receive the gesture and return it in equal or greater kind is important not only as a rather negative means of saving face but also as a positive way of achieving higher status.

These bases on which the patronage system rests provide at once a framework to build on and a pattern to copy. In line with the definition given, one may see that the patronage system embraces all figures in the authoritarian structure, both spiritual and temporal. God is the final patron and the ultimate source of all patronage; bracketed with the Father are the other two members of the Trinity. Yet, the patronage system, depending as it does on essentially personal relationships, naturally favours the completely human figures of the Virgin and the saints who are thought to intercede with the utterly spiritual trinity of authority.

So too with the ecclesiastical authorities who are thought to be next closest to the Godhead and therefore competent through their monopoly of spiritual powers to dispense indulgences. Moreover, since prelates in general are automatically associated in the popular mind with administrative and judicial officials as part of the authoritarian structure on earth, their assistance at some point in the total patronage system is considered essential.

Since the sixteenth century Spain has been ruled by a bureaucratic absolutism. Many bureaucrats (if not all) themselves owe their present positions to either direct nepotism or to conscious use of a patronage group. They thus tend to perpetuate a procedure to which they originally resorted and to which they are committed and indebted. Each official, major or minor, weaves himself a web of influence and support with the object of absorbing the maximum possible power into his own hands. The concept of *mando personal* — personal command — is not peculiar to the present regime. Everyone wants and strives to be a "chief", to be a power unto himself, "responsible only to God and to history".

Similar observations could be made of the power elites (a relative term) in the political and economic spheres, themselves duplicated in miniature at progressively lower levels in society. The smallest political unit in community terms is the pueblo wherein the power elite effectively controls patronage on a social as well as on a political and economic plane. In other contexts, this elite has been referred to as "gatekeepers" in that they largely domi-

nate the paths linking the local infrastructure of the village to the superstructure of the outside urban world. The mayor, the priest, the Civil Guard sergeant, the doctor, the rich landlord are well-known leaders or "chiefs" who play, as the mood moves them, an innovating or controlling role in local affairs. Their friendship, their interest, their influence, their benevolence and indeed their services must be courted in case of need or difficulty. They in turn are linked to the towns through more powerful urban patrons as clients themselves.

Spain has been called the land of the *patria chica* because of the strength of municipal feeling and the desire to live in compact communities. Here is an urban-minded people living, in the main, under harsh rural-type conditions. Consumed with a passionate envy due to an inordinate individualism, obsessed by an exaggerated sense of honour and a dread of shame, plagued by a peevish fear of public opinion and a preoccupation with the temporality of this earthly existence, the Castilian takes refuge behind the solid walls of his family group. Yet, only by extending these walls through the artifices of godparenthood and the patronage system can his kin's interests be safeguarded outside the family.

Only a few of the outward expressions of the patronage system can be stated here. It is increasingly the case that godparents for a child are chosen from outside the effective kin circle, where available kin fail to provide a secure source of influence. This is particularly true in urban areas where an employer or an influential friend is selected because he belongs to a more powerful patronage group. He is expected to sponsor the child when it grows up and, incidentally, to aid the family in the meantime. The godfather, whose responsibilities to the child begin on a spiritual plane, gradually acquires social responsibilities to the family as a whole. The spiritual and social welfare of the child become fused by present-giving at Baptism, Confirmation and First Communion ceremonies; by care and guidance during school; by assistance on entering a career, on marriage, and even at death—in fact, at the crises in life. Should the child be left parentless, the godparent is expected to bring him up.

At the village level, the Mayor and *cacique* (the local prototype of the political "boss") consciously trade patronage for political and material support. It is a common thing for the sixth or

seventh son of a poor family to be sent to the seminary and trained for the priesthood through the good graces and sponsorship of a local patron. The father, for his part, will extend his services as a voter and also as a shepherd or harvest worker to the patron of his son. The son/priest in turn will ensure his patron's spiritual welfare by prayer and special Masses said for his benefit.

In the towns and cities, the "arranging" of affairs with official-dom becomes the concern of the patronage system. Certificates are required for mere vicinage, social benefits, all kinds of trading activity, voting, and even migration—for a man may be returned to his pueblo unless he can prove that he will live with relatives or has a house to go to. Entry to certain schools may depend on presentation of a certificate of Baptism and perhaps First Com-munion as well. Most applications for certificates are usually made in triplicate and must be countersigned elsewhere. It is not surprising that many agencies now offer to deal with the whole procedure of official applications for a small fee. Otherwise, the man claiming sickness benefits or seeking a housing permit or the like must lose many mornings' work waiting at government offices. Where his personal presence is not necessary his wife may go in his stead taking her sewing and a sandwich especially if she has to wait for hours at the window-counter marked "URGENT". Once made, the application takes months to clear and its success is always in doubt.

At a higher level in the urban setting where power is more closely associated with wealth, lobbying for the highly prized and exclusive concessions such as import and export licenses reveals a specially intimate type of patronage "pyramid". It is not a question here of considering that one may be entitled to these things by right, for between what is one's right and what is pos-sible lie a thousand indifferent shrugs of the shoulder.

The process of circumventing these obstacles thrown up by authority can only be eased by having an *amigo*—a friend—in the right places. To have *enchufe* (literally meaning "plug") is to be able to make contact with the right people at a judicious moment. It is the new equivalent of the old friend at Court. It is a short cut through the maze of authority which balances the tension between State and community. It is the rule of *amig-ocracy*.

The sheer impersonality of officialdom places the bureaucrat at a social distance from the ordinary citizen and, in a sense, gives him added power. The diversity of urban life and regulation by specialized agencies whose equivalent function in the village would be on an informal level throw up complicated strata of power and authority which can only be dealt with by cultivated friendship and patronage. The enormous bulk of documentation required at every turn induces a procrastination increased by the supineness of poorly-paid officials which is said to breed corruption at the upper strata and to occasion letters of recommendation by the hundred to the humblest office manager.

To embark with any reasonable chance of rapid success on any venture involving a brush with the authorities, one must be armed with a battery of recommendations. These usually take the form of visiting cards which are now rarely used as such by the actual owner of the card. Rather, a patron will give to his client a card covered with phrases indicating that he "has great interest" in the bearer and signed with protestations of friendship to his contact—usually a patron of similar status in an influential position. It has the magical quality of a passport which opens many doors to success.

Obligation to kin overrides all other obligation and onto the kin circle widened by ritual god-parenthood is welded the *amigocracy* or friendship pattern. But friendship has never been disinterested and its obligations and rights, like those of the family, are based on a reciprocity of services which are more important than mere duty to employer or State. One may be drawn into aiding a friend of a friend of a cousin one has never seen. This sort of extension is often a cause of annoyance to many. Yet it is the logical outcome of the system and it may be considered as the "throwing stick" of the extended family unit which gives it more power and range when dealing with the excesses or defects of authority. If, for example, the so-called black market operates freely in public it does so because it is sanctioned by the community. It cannot therefore have the same sinister connotation that it has acquired in English. Where the State fails the people will take over and it does so by adapting its normal kin and friendship patterns to the needs of the situation. Thus, when something is highly desirable and in short supply, helping a friend

or relative (whose name is lower down on the priority list than a mere stranger's name) is considered only right and proper; and this even though the favour has not been solicited and the action strictly illegal.

It is not, therefore, mere caprice which governs favouritism in, for example, the granting of awards, titles, contracts or concessions, or, more important still, the provision of sinecures and jobs with security of tenure and care. The final commander of the Armada, the Duke of Medina-Sidonia, was not a naval man and was prone to seasickness, but he was a favourite for whom a post had to be procured.[1] The lament of those days . . . "so many men without posts; so many posts without men" . . . had a double edge for it is not so much a question of the right man for the job as of having (or even creating) a job for the right man. The "right" man, in terms of patronage, should not be confused with the "best" man, in terms of efficiency.

Nevertheless, the patron/client relationship is not a one-way affair only, with the client being a passive recipient of the patron's favours. It is the client's bounden duty not only to promise loyalty and support to his patron but actively to fulfil that promise and voice it abroad. By doing so he not only obeys a fundamental rule of the patronage system, i.e., that of constantly stimulating loyalty channels, but he also creates good will, adds to the name and fame of his patron and thus ensures him a species of immortality.

This is quite evident in the case of religious patrons of whom there are many and various. Apart from one's own namesake (a patron/protector from the moment of birth), there are patron saints for every association from bullfighters to bootblacks, for almost every part of the body, for finding or keeping a fiancé, for reaping a good harvest—for almost every situation of need one may imagine. The clients who seek favours through the patronage of the Virgin or a patron saint make "promises". It should be noted here that such promises are to be carried out only if and when the favour is granted. The outward symbols of these promises can be seen in the mauve shirts or dresses worn publicly

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[1] Even though he did not relish the task. There are times when unsolicited "favours" by a patron can prove embarrassing, even dangerous. This is a case in point.

for set periods; in the penances such as walking barefoot (trailing chains by the ankle) or carrying heavy crosses in Holy Week processions; in pilgrimages to designated shrines; in the donation lists of good causes; or in the simple placing of specially carved candles before an image of the Virgin or patron saint. In many country churches, as also in the smaller urban churches found in the twisting side streets, the walls are covered with *ex-votos*— miniature facsimiles in wax of a person or part of the body that has been cured. These outward signs are the client's accepted way of repaying the services of his religious patron. They are a mute and proud public testimony of the power and influence of a patron who spreads his favours widely.

Clients may of course have a number of patrons, for it is always wise to cover oneself. Yet, in stressing the reciprocity rule— equally valid for the patron/patron relationship—one sees that at the back of the material advantages involved there lie a striving to level out great inequalities, a fight against growing anonymity (especially in the urban setting), and a seeking out of the primary personal relationship. For the client, of course, there is as well the material benefit gained: for the patron there is his "investment" in supporters—his clients; between patrons themselves there is a comfortable cementing of relationships. The success or failure of these motivating factors is clearly revealed only in a crisis when protestations of loyalty and support significantly show the alignment of forces and the delineation of patronage "pyramids." Spanish political life has been marked by the manoeuvering of such groups until a "strong man" emerges around whom spheres of patronage newly orbit. To a lesser degree, they are evident also in the rival cults of the Virgin and saints when, as patrons of villages or parishes or organizations, they are at times used as symbols of hostility between groups.

In short, the patronage system, working in one particular context at a fixed point in time, may be visualized diagramatically as a pyramidal structure. At the top, is the supreme patron—God— Who, in the last resort, has no need of favours (or support) from anyone. In descending order of size, I see, enclosed by the whole pyramidal structure, separate autonomous pyramids of influence. At the top of each reigns a patron, and the sides and base of the pyramid are composed of clients who are themselves patrons to

subordinate groups of clients. Circling the peaks of patronage pyramids are groups composed of patrons of more or less equal power who communicate with each other on behalf of their respective clients. At the base of the whole pyramidal structure are the disconnected clients at the lowest level who are never patrons unless they climb the sides of the pyramid.

One should point out here that a diagram is an abstraction, a tool, not to be reified, for then it loses its value as a guide. There can of course be movements up and down the pyramid of patronage, for, let there be no mistake, as soon as a patron becomes weak and is unable to fulfil his role, another will be sought who is more effective. In this sense the client/patron relationship at least is ruthless.

Only clients at the base, and God will have no circle of equals in the patron to patron relationship since the one is forever a client and the other is forever a patron. With these exceptions, everyone is at some time or another (in one role or another) both patron and client. I conclude, therefore, that there are three basic functional types of structural relationship in the patronage system: (a) the patron/client, (b) the patron/patron and (c) the client/patron. There can, by definition, never be a client/client relationship because, at the moment the one offers the other some service under the patronage system he ceases to be a client in that context.

I have attempted to portray the essence of the patronage system as I see it operating in Spain today. There are many refinements to such a system not included here. They must form the basis of a further study at greater length to be made in the future.

PATTERNS OF KINSHIP, COMPARAGGIO AND COMMUNITY IN A SOUTH ITALIAN VILLAGE[1]

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In an earlier day, the strategic position of Cortina d'Aglio*, astride the confluence of three rivers, served the community by affording a degree of protection against the incursions of brigands and warring barons. For more than ten centuries Cortina remained in relative isolation. In 1875, the post office was established and ten years later, the telegraph line reached the village. By 1892, Cortina was included on the somewhat irregular stagecoach route to the provincial capital. Geographically, Cortina remains relatively isolated to the present day; the nearest secondary State highway is some ten kilometers away.

There is little to differentiate Cortina from hundreds of villages in South Italy. Its history is virtually undistinguished from that of southern Italy generally. Eighty-six per cent of its labor force is engaged in agriculture. Unlike the rest of the South, Cortina exhibits a well-established pattern of individual land-ownership among its peasantry. The basic farming pattern of the Agliese is one of self-sufficiency. Each farmer attempts to supply all of the agricultural needs of his family; he rarely produces a marketable surplus from his small (2 to 3 *hectare* [5 to 7½ acres]) holding. As in most of the South, the farmer generally lives in the village and journeys to his land each day; 81% of the 3532 residents live in the village proper.

The rigors of eking out a meager living from barren soil, the geographic and social isolation of the village, and illiteracy have contributed, over the centuries, to a limited horizon for the peasantry. For the average southern peasant, his world begins and ends with the confines of the village. Even with the advent

* a pseudonym for a village in the Molisan Appenines.

of the radio, the peasant continues to identify himself with the village. Through bitter experience he has learned to trust, or distrust least, those who live within the sound of the local church bell (*campanilismo*). Government is a meaningless and nebulous concept to the peasant. Rome is distant and epitomizes those who have lived off the labors of the farmer. The land owner, the police, the tax collector, and even the priest have come to symbolize those who are out to milk the peasant.

The traveling merchants who come to the village during the *fiere* (fair) which accompany a *festa* (feast day) are viewed as unscrupulous sharpies. They are wily and full of big city tricks. Even the local merchants are not to be fully trusted. But if one must deal with someone outside the circle of kin, better a *paesano* (fellow-villager) than a stranger. Everyone knows that it is best to "marry women and buy cattle from your fellow villagers."

Most villages in the South exhibit a degree of *campanilismo*. Cortina, however, differs in this respect. There are two church parishes in this village; Santa Maria Assunta surrounds the old castle at the crest of the hill; San Silvestro extends down the hill toward the Valley. The Agliese refer to the parishes as: Upper Land and Lower Land (*Terra di Sopra* and *Terra di Basso*). As we noted, Cortina does not exhibit the usual *campanilismo*, instead it is a case of double-*campanilismo* based on parish lines.

The residents of Cortina claim that the two parishes exhibit such vast differences in pronounciation as to warrant the use of the term "dialect differences." Local conjecture maintains that the two parishes stem from two different "ethnic" groups; the Upper Towners claim that they are of indigenous stock and that the Lower Towners are later arrivals, probably from the region of Naples. These claims are supported by the residents by citing dialect variations. The Upper "dialect" has a "French accent" and the Lower "dialect" is labeled as being more like the Neapolitan pronounciation. A comparison of "dialect" forms does not lend strong support to the claims of "differential" origins. However, what *is* important is the belief on the part of the villagers that the "dialects" differ *and* the fact that they act in accordance with that belief.

From the viewpoint of the Upper villagers the Lower Town residents are less civil and inferior socially. The Upper Towners regard themselves as possessing a superior "cultured" background;

the old castle is located in that part of town and the ducal families of French and Spanish origin lived there.

Should a man from the lower village come to a dance being held in the Upper Town, he would be invited to dance. However, if an upper villager were to go to a dance in the other part of town he might be allowed in but he would not be invited to dance. Of course, he probably would not want to dance with the women anyhow since all Uppers know that the Lower women are whores.

The Lowers are regarded as being too intense in their card playing. A case was cited where lower village men played cards behind locked doors on Christmas Eve; the game went on all through the night and all the next day.

The Upper townspeople regard their hilltop vantage point as more favorable than the depressive atmosphere of the Lower town. The air is fresher, the streets are better, the piazza is nicer, the people are more genteel, in essence, the whole town is a better place to live in. The Lowers, obviously, suffer more, their town is not as nice; because of this the Lowers are not as civil. Even worse, the Lowers are more given to *campanilismo* even though they have no reason to take pride in their town.

From the other side of the parish boundary one receives a different picture. From the viewpoint of the Lowers we learn that the Uppers are not really superior but simply put on false airs. The Lowers claim that they work much harder than the Uppers. The Upper villagers resort to theft and are untrustworthy.

There are more refinements of life in the Lower village according to its residents. The Lower town bars have toilets and the Upper bars do not. The "magnificent" outdoor urinal in the Lower piazza is a great source of local pride. There is even one house with a bidet. The Lower villagers regard their pronunciation as softer and more pleasant than the harsh, French-like accents of the Uppers. On the whole, the Lowers consider themselves as more sincere and less devious than the Uppers.

There are some differences between the two parishes that can be verified by independent observation. Each parish tends toward endogamy. When mixed marriages do occur, it is usually women of the Lower village who marry Upper village men. Upper village women rarely marry Lower village men since they do not wish to live so far out in the country (less than one kilometer from the central piazza).

More artisans and merchants are found in the Upper town. This is probably a hold-over from the service functions performed by the ducal retainers during the feudal period. More farmers live in the Lower village but the Lower village exhibits a higher out-migration rate. In-migrants come from other villages in the Abruzzi and from elsewhere along the eastern coast; they are considered as being of another ethnic group by the Agliese.

Although governed by the same mayor and town council, the citizens of the two parishes share little community feeling in common. Political divisions reflect, to some extent, the split based on *campanilismo*. There are more Communists in the Lower town, more Socialists in the Upper. The majority coalition, a local slate, draws its strength from both parishes. The current coalition, a new alignment of forces since the 1952 election, is right-of-center and includes the neo-Fascists. The political party, as an example of a voluntary association, is, at best, an unstable compromise of highly individualistic attitudes. A cynical Italian joke underlines the problem: A political party composed of five Italians will have six political philosophies.[2]

According to both archpriests in Cortina, religious unity in the village is conspicuously absent. (According to most informants, religion itself is absent). The two parishes have different patron saints and their religious calendars differ somewhat. Despite many attempts on the part of the clergy to weld a bond between the two parishes the division continues. In recent years, the archpriests have exchanged pulpits on varying occasions; this excited little enthusiasm on the part of the parishoners. There are but two *feste* shared in common between the parishes: San Vitale (Patron of the Upper town) and San Antonio Padova (Patron of the Lower town). These *feste* cover two days (20-21 August). Each year a committee is created to collect funds to defray the expenses of the festival (fireworks, a marching and concert band, flowers, etc.). The cost of the *feste* generally exceeds $500; the Agliese now living in Rome and the United States contribute about 60 per cent of the funds, and the balance is collected locally. At one time, a joint confraternity composed of members of both parishes arranged the celebrations but, like

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[2] For a discussion of the inability of Italian villagers to effect political compromise see Banfield (1958).

most voluntary associations, fell apart because of inter-parish and inter-familial rivalries.

In one respect, the parishes seem to be united in that church attendance is, by and large, limited to women. The women take a more active interest in religion than do the men but, it should be noted, that religious activities involve a minority of the population. The two archpriests united in forming a *Circolo ACLI* (Workers' Catholic Action Circle) and furnished a club house that is used, for the most part, by the two archpriests.

There are few examples, at the community level, of voluntary associations. A war veterans organization exists in Cortina but there is no active membership. The deep-seated *individualismo,* so basic to South Italy, frustrates the creation of common solutions to common problems. There exists a circle of intellectuals, a loosely-knit semi-formalized association, composed of the mayor, pharmacist, attorney, physician, the school teachers, and a minor civil servant (who now lives in Rome but vacations in Cortina each summer). The members pay dues of Lire 500 (80 cents) per year and meet, from time to time, at the bar on the Upper town piazza. Aside from the discussions of politics and soccer, this group attempted to create a program of practical education for the school children. They planned to teach the children how to write business letters, use a telephone, make application for jobs, and a host of other matters not covered by the public school curriculum. The program was aborted by a lack of interest on the part of the residents.

One may legitimately wonder about the apparent lack of commonality of feeling in Cortina. It is assumed that village society would tend toward primary group relations within the community. It is assumed, too, that the isolated, relatively homogeneous, peasant community would exhibit a high degree of moral integration and, hence, a strong bond of community feeling.

We have, of course, documented the inter-parish rivalry that exists within the village and this, perhaps, explains, to some degree, why there is little community feeling that cuts across parish boundaries. Yet, it does not explain the lack of community feeling within each parish.

The economic factor cannot be overlooked in this analysis. In the words of one informant: "Life is hell and work is a beast." The economic struggle occupies many of the waking hours of

the peasantry. But, this explanation is insufficient in itself to account for the almost complete lack of voluntary associations at the community level.

The families of Cortina, like the South Italian family generally, exhibit a high degree of solidarity. Deeply-rooted traditions plus a pattern of economic self-sufficiency help sustain the monolithic structure of the family.[3]

In Cortina, as elsewhere in the South, the neolocal nuclear family derives its significance from the larger *Famiglia*. Marriage is, of course, the union between two *Famiglie;* and, the nuclear unit is considered part of the larger consanguineal and affinal Family. However, greatest reliance is placed upon the nuclear unit, which becomes a *personal community* for its members (Henry 1958). Banfield (1958) identifies the "amoral familism" which stems from this system of support for the nuclear family as one of the major reasons for the near-chaotic political picture of South Italy. In Cortina one normally includes cousins to the third degree as part of the family; although the title *cugino* may be attached to even more remote kin. The term *fratello-cugino* (brother cousin) is limited to first cousins. However, older cousins, regardless of degree, are usually addressed as *zio* (dialect *z'zi*) (uncle). Again, the term *z'zi* (*z'iutt-e*) or *z'ia* (*z'iotta*) (aunt) is often used to signify any older member of the kin group.

While separate terms are used to designate father-in-law (*suocero*) and mother-in-law (*suocera*), the title of address is always *papá* and *mamá* (as is used for one's own parents). As one informant put it: "I couldn't think of calling my father-in-law by his name (Michele). He has gray hair and little of it, therefore one must use a name of respect." To which the informant's father-in-law replied: "If you called me other than Papá, I would think bad of you."

The family serves not only as a status-giving unit but also tends to provide the individual with most of his psychological satisfactions. While intimate associations may take place outside the family setting, for the most part, the family tends toward self-sufficiency in the socio-psychological realm. Only rarely is a stranger admitted into the home and even then is never admitted into the innercircle of confidence. Family problems remain in

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[3] See Moss and Thomson.

the family. To discuss troubles of a personal nature with one outside the circle of kin is to lose face in the village.

Family contacts remain strong even after one has moved from the village. Well developed lines of communication exist between Agliese families in Rome, Youngstown (Ohio), Fairmount (W. Va.), and Detroit and their kin in the village. Consequently, the average Agliese knows more about these distant communities than he knows about Naples (which is less than a 100 miles away).

Beyond the kinship bonds are the ties that exist within the system of *comparaggio* or *comparotto* (godparenthood). This system stems from the Roman Catholic practice wherein the sponsors guarantee the induction into the faith of the child. The godparents pledge to act as guides for the religious training of the child. The Agliese recognize three degrees of *comparaggio:* godparents at the time of 1) baptism; 2) confirmation and, 3) marriage.[4]

Several informants contended that the godparent at the time of confirmation is more important than the godparent at baptism. It is generally agreed that the godparents at the time of marriage are the least important and, in fact, this godparent role has been replaced by the *testimonie* (witnesses). However, the witnesses are called *compadre l'anello* (godparent of the ring).

Godparents are accorded a high degree of respect and are always addressed by the titles: Godfather — *compadre* or *padrino* (dialect—*pati'n-o*) (dialect diminutive—*comparil*); Godmother *commare* (dialect — *patina*) (dialect diminutive — *commarrella*).

In Cortina, a godmother is never called *Madrina* since this would imply a division of the mother's responsibility and everyone knows that a mother's responsibility may not be shared.

The person chosen for the godparent role may be a relative or a friend. In many cases, it is a person from outside the village. The morality of the godparent is an important factor. A whore or a thief is never chosen. Sometimes the choice is made on the basis of the potential godparent's economic ability to bestow gifts on the child.

When a person is requested to serve as godparent he must

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[4] Cf. Anderson (1956 and 1957).

accept ("You *cannot* refuse San Giovanni" — patron of god-parents). Likewise, should one wish to be a godparent and make his wish known, the parents are obligated to select that person, even though they wish another to be the sponsor of their child.

For baptism, a person of like-sex is usually chosen as godparent for the child. For communion, a person of like-sex is always chosen as the godparent of the communicant.

The godparent has a specific role to perform. He is to set a moral example for the child. The godparent is morally responsible for the education and welfare of the child if its parents should die. If the godparent resides in Rome, or in the United States, and should the child migrate to that place, the godparent is asked to "look after" the child. If the godparent is economically able, he is expected to lend his godchild money at no interest.

One other factor emerges with regard to the bond of *comparaggio;* the godparent is the only one outside the family circle in whom the child may confide. The godparent is the only outsider permitted to share in the problems and joys of the family. In this role, the godparent is cast as intimate and helpmate to the child. They are united in San Giovanni.

In the light of this discussion, it can be seen that the cohesive nature of the family, close kinship ties, and the bonds of *comparaggio* set limits to the social participation of the individual. We have hypothesized elsewhere that the structure of the family is Italy's greatest strength and greatest weakness. Because of familial cohesiveness, Italy has endured through war, depressions, and governmental crises. Yet because of its cohesiveness, the family has limited external contacts for its members and has actually stifled the development of voluntary associations. (Moss and Thomson.)

While identification with community does exist, as we have witnessed in the case of *campanilismo,* it cannot be said that this identification necessarily leads to community participation and community responsibility. Neither have we discovered the close, intimate, primary social relations which, supposedly, encompass the total life of the village. While primary relations do exist outside the family setting, we had best describe these patterns of interaction as *discontinuous circles of intimacy.* Despite its isolated position, relative homogeneity of its population, and smallness of

size Cortina exhibits an intricate web of social relations which tends to cast doubt on the legitimacy of those views which maintain the simplicity of peasant society.

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MARITAL PROPERTY CONSIDERATIONS AMONG PEASANTS: AN ITALIAN EXAMPLE

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As students of the primitive world, anthropologists have become acquainted with a particular range of custom relating to marital property considerations. These include gift exchange, bride price, and bride service. We have permitted ourselves less opportunity to become familiar with those prevailing arrangements in complex societies. The study of peasant society affords us this perspective. Arensberg and Kimball's (1940) now classical analysis of marriage in County Clare is a case in point. In European Old World culture the most prevalent property transaction was the dowry, but a survey of community studies shows that this custom is not consistently practised today. For instance, Wylie (1957) reports few marriage contracts in modern-day Peyrane.

Pitt-Rivers (1954) says that in Alcalá property traditionally does not pass until death, and dowries are rare.

Halpern (1958) tells us, though, that in the Serbian village of Orašac the institution of the dowry is a relatively new development, springing from Western ideas, and is becoming increasingly elaborate.

Obviously, given these data, it would be difficult to generalize about the role of the dowry in contemporary European peasant culture. At best we may state that property arrangements are a product of local cultural needs and conditions. It is our opinion, however, that where they exist they perform an important integrating function in local community life. More specifically, in the case of the community of Sermoneta in South Central Italy, they serve also as a facilitator of culture change.

In considering the theoretical implication of change in peasant society we need to investigate not only cultural pressures external to the community but also take note of those specific internal vehicles by which innovation is channeled and integrated. Threat is reduced and acceptance increased when change is couched

in a traditional medium. I suggest that the *corredo*[1] (dowry) in Sermoneta serves this function. Today the tempo of change is growing but the disparity between the peasant's way of life in Sermoneta and the urbanite's way of life in Rome is still great despite their relative nearness. The peasant is exposed to demands upon him to acquire new cultural goods and aspirations. Much he resists, but he adopts some. A great deal of what he accepts, at least materially, is included within the burgeoning but familiar *corredo*. Our intent, then, in this paper is two-fold. First to describe the custom of the *corredo* itself in Sermoneta, and then look further at its specific implications for change.

Sermoneta is a predominately agricultural community located on the edge of the now reclaimed Pontine Marshes. Land ownership is not widely diffused and the majority either sharecrop or work as day laborers. Family organization follows a nuclear pattern and residence is predominately neolocal. This area like the rest of the South has been economically depressed for a long time.

Courtship in Sermoneta is of considerable duration and this is so for several reasons. It is said that it takes years to become familiar with the "character" of the person you are to marry, and one may never be too sure in this regard for there is little opportunity for separation after marriage. Some girls become engaged, *fa l'amore*, when they are 14 but the majority wait until 15 or 16. They do not marry as a rule until they are 20 or 21, maintaining that *Mamá* has need of them in the house and it is not fair to leave too soon. Furthermore young men must often postpone their weddings until they have helped their sisters to marry. The more important reason, though, for the usually lengthy engagement is found in the amount of time necessary to accumulate the required number of goods to set up a new household. For the well-to-do this is not of such concern, but for the majority the financial outlay for a marriage can be met only over an extended period of time.

At the outset of a courtship it is generally impossible for the families to make a reliable prediction of the date of the ceremony. There is a wide range of variables to be considered, most of them

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1. Strictly translated the Italian *corredo* means trousseau. But trousseau, referring to the personal possessions of the bride, clothing, linen, is far too restricted a concept for our purposes. Although dowry is generally associated in our minds with land and/or money, I have preferred its usage here.

beyond the control of the persons involved. The goods that are brought to the marriage by either the man or the woman are bought articles. The purchasing power of the families is largely dependent, among other things, upon the weather and the general state of the crops. Too much rain for wheat in June or a hail storm ruining the olive crop may force postponement of a wedding for a year. A common response to an inquiry concerning the date of a prospective wedding is: "after the harvest." The ! l of employment also affects the ability of a family to make necessary purchases. The number of persons who have steady incomes is relatively small.

The system must therefore be sufficiently flexible to meet exigencies. At the first formal meeting which takes place between the two sets of parents, after the boy and girl have agreed to marry, a preliminary discussion is made of the mutual obligations of both parties. To avoid possible recriminations, though, no specific listing is made of the items to be accumulated. This gathering merely blocks out, so to speak, the major expectations. Only when most of the goods have been acquired, and the prospects favorable for obtaining the rest, is a date set. This usually occurs a month or two before the ceremony. But even at this point the possibility of unforseeable mishaps makes precise plans difficult.

Furthermore, the time required for preparation differs between the man and the woman. As she must bring more to the marriage than he, the pacing towards the climax is apt to be set by her family rather than his. The verbal cue to a son's or daughter's state of preparedness is the word ready, *"pronto."* A woman will speak of her daughter as being ready or not ready. Oftentimes a mother will use the pronoun *Io,* I, "am ready or not ready yet." While this may indicate an identification with a daughter in her coming marriage it is also the case that the mother largely supervises the process of accumulation. Remarks as to the relative state of preparedness are often used as thinly veiled criticisms of the other family.

On the bride's part, the first item to be collected is sheets. Sheeting is bought at market and a girl begins embroidering between the ages of 12 and 14, that is often before she is engaged. Sometimes, in the past, mothers themselves began this work while their daughters were still infants. Some girls now

wait until they are older if there is little money, or if there is
enough money so that less has to be done by hand. A girl who
begins at any early age embroidering sheets, pillowcases and
other linen, is considered wholesome and serious, thus increasing
her changes for making a good match. The *corredo* is augmented
too by the girl's mother who may add sheets of her own.

Estimation of trousseau size is approximated in terms of sheets.
There would seem to be a rather close correlation between this
number and the gross class categories of the community. The
few very wealthy families are known to provide as many as 100
sheets for their daughters, and the lesser landowners 50. Well-
to-do peasants and the merchants provide 24 while the respect-
able minimum which the great majority bring is a dozen. Occa-
sional reference is made to someone who is marrying *senza niente*
(without anything) but this is never literally the case, for at least
6 sheets are always required. Everyone in Sermoneta knows
quite well the potentiality of any girl and her family for provid-
ing sheets. There is an element of competition here for a girl is
apt to try and surpass her limit and arrive at the last minute with
a higher number than expected, thus making a *bella figura*.

Although sheets are traditionally the core of the *corredo*, the
furniture that a girl must bring constitutes the most costly item
and is becoming increasingly expensive. In past times the pros-
pective bride would provide little more than a bed, table, and a
few chairs and some kitchen equipment, besides her linen. This
was considered sufficient but now with the advent of installment
plan buying her obligation is greater. Today a couple's bedroom
should be furnished not only with a bed but a chest of drawers,
a large cupboard, dressing table and chair, as well as two small
bed tables. Apart from furnishing the bedroom and bringing
kitchen utensils, the bride has the option of providing kitchen
furniture or a dining set. The latter has become a prestige item,
and even though hardly any peasant family has a dining room,
it makes a good impression to buy one.

While the bride's corredo in Sermoneta includes all the furn-
ishings plus many personal items of apparel, the obligation for
the man is far less. He brings what is referred to as the *oro*, that
is, gold necklace, gold earrings and a wedding ring. He also pays
for the bride's wedding dress and a going-away dress, and shoes
for both, as well as a new suit to be married in, shirts, underwear

and shoes for himself. As we have noted there are pressures for both the bride and groom to bring more. It is becoming fashionable, for instance, to give the bride a watch and an engagement ring in addition to the other jewelry. Similarly, the small bottled-gas stove introduced to Sermoneta within the past few years is in the process of being incorporated into the bride's *corredo*.

About a month before the wedding the bride, her parents, and sometimes the groom and his mother go to Latina, the provincial capital, to choose the furniture and make the first down-payment. About a week before the ceremony it is brought up to the village and displayed in the bride's home with the rest of the *corredo*. Relatives and friends come to inspect her good fortune. Quality of the furniture is appraised, springs and mattresses tested, sheets counted. Careful mental notes are taken to be weighed with other relevant data in estimating the worth of the match. The final passing of judgment is made following the nuptial feast.

A successful feast requires preparation of several months. The two families share equally in the cost. Chickens must be located and fattened, stores of *pasta,* tomato paste, wine, and olive oil are accumulated, table cloths, silverware and glasses borrowed. Here too is an element of uncertainty due to the vagaries of nature and the logistical problems attendant upon affecting convergence of supplies and people upon the right day. The sine qua non of the feast is the superfluity of courses and a variety of drinks. The guests' needs are of no concern. It is the abundant hospitality of two families that is on display.

An average total cost of *corredo* and feast is difficult to estimate because of the variation of outlay. If we consider a typical pattern based on 12 sheets, personal linen, bedroom furniture, and kitchen furniture and equipment, we arrive at a figure of 240,000 lire or 400 dollars for the bride, not including the feast itself. The groom's expenses are about half, that is 120,000 lire or 200 dollars. Considering that the average take-home pay of the worker is just a little over a dollar on the days that he works (perhaps 7 months of the year), one can appreciate the sacrifice that the *corredo* represents.

Although the father of several daughters may be regarded as afflicted with a personal calamity, the *corredo* is widely accepted

as essential for marriage. How else, it is argued, may a young couple set up a new household? And once they are married, whatever money can be set aside must go for buying the first baby's layette. All future income will be consumed in keeping a growing family clothed and fed. The family of procreation cannot be expected to furnish a house. Each marrying pair must count on the concerted efforts of their families of orientation.

From the vantage point of the observer, the process of property accumulation may be seen as reinforcing the process of emotional commitment. The contrapuntal arrangement of the two independent but related themes of love and property operates to increase the surety of a successful match. The romantic aspect of the engagement period is highly valued and is indeed regarded as the "happiest" period of one's life, but marriage cannot be dominated by emotion alone. Status considerations are crucial. Marriage is expected to unite persons of approximate equal social worth. Family name, land, bridal virginity, a steady job, diploma or degree, motorbike or automobile, are all values to be taken into account. The readily quantifiable nature of the *corredo* makes for more precise equalization. The greater cash value of the woman's contribution is balanced off by the nature of the groom's livelihood. In a society where social stratification is important and sensitivity to status differential high, the *corredo* functions to maintain class endogamy. But it may also be used as a lever for social mobility. A family can hope to improve its position through equipping a daughter with a favorable dowry. It must be careful, however, not to be seen as striving too hard, for then people will say that the girl is marrying only for *interesse* (material advantage). Gossip or not most parents feel the raison d'etre of their existence is to *sistemare* their children, that is marry and establish them well. The accumulation of the *corredo* helps to objectify their life goal in concrete terms, and the work involved provides roles for all familial members. If the mother is the chief strategist, husband and sons bring home the cash necessary for its growth. Older sisters will marry before younger. A brother may not marry until the last girl has been helped to leave the house.

The *corredo*, then, is an insurance for familial well-being and security. But in a larger sense it may be regarded as filling an

important economic function in the community as a whole. The value placed on cutting a good figure in the public eye spurs families on to commit themselves to heavy spending, and a consequent stimulus to the production and distribution of certain goods. Furthermore, the recent advent of installment-plan buying and the availability of manufactured goods in the Latina stores has intensified this status affirmation. As we have noted, obligations have increased over a generation ago. Items being added to the *corredo* are prestigeful ones of urban middle class origin new to the countryman; gold wrist watches, gas stoves and dining room furniture.

In Sermoneta the man who improves his lot to the comparative detriment of others may invite the evil eye. The evil eye inhibits social deviation and cultural change. But the *corredo* is regarded as a legitimate means of property accumulation. Goods incorporated within this context are legitimized and accepted. Thus the traditional pattern of the *corredo* serves as a vehicle for innovation and cultural change.

One of the major theoretical concerns in the investigation of the peasant society is that of specifying the process by which these part-cultures become adjusted to the cultural whole. From a social-structural point of view, the role of the intelligensia, as interpreters of the Great Tradition to bearers of the Little Tradition, has been pointed out elsewhere. It is well to keep in mind, however, that peasant recourse to the elite is not sufficient to explain cultural innovation. Peasant hostility toward this group is a real barrier to acceptance of cultural artifacts from them. A satisfactory explanation of culture change in peasant societies must also be able to specify traditional patterns which, because they are more acceptable themselves, may serve as effective media for change. I suggest that the *corredo* as it operates in Sermoneta is such a pattern.

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ASPECTS OF TURKISH KINSHIP AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE[1]

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This preliminary study seeks to demonstrate that a culture, using the term in its generally accepted anthropological sense, may modify and change through historic processes, while the social structure associated with it, again employing a term about which there is ethnological agreement, may remain as an historic constant. The reasons for this may presumably be found in the quality of the culture and in the nature of the social system.

Modern Turkey offers one of those paradoxical situations, not uncommon in the world today, of industrialized urban life existing side by side with the folk culture, in Redfield's sense, resident in a rural peasant population. It is estimated that 75% of the Turkish population in Turkey falls into the rural and village-dwelling category (Robinson, 1955-56), a fact which might suggest some discontent or unrest emanating from a majority in some measure politically and economically exploited by a sophisticated urban minority. Some societies, as is well known, find such a situation too great a burden with the result that disintegration and social upheaval come about. But in the Turkish case, the general adaptation to historic circumstances has been such as to keep alive a highly resilient social structure, one which exhibits surprisingly little cracking even if the cultural fabric has been modified again and again. Turkish life, in short, both today and yesterday, exhibits a fairly rigid social structure in a marginal, hence readily modifiable and adaptable, social culture.

Both geography and history have produced Turkish cultural marginality. Istanbul may be a gateway to the Balkans but it,

along with Anatolia generally, became a kind of cultural cul-
de-sac when the importance of other Middle Eastern areas is
considered. The Turkish difficulty arose largely because the
Turks themselves were parvenus in Southwest Asia. It was
historical accident that took them out of their pastoral life in
the Asiatic steppes, that converted them to Islam, and handed
to them the guardianship of Arab civilizaion. But this all came
at a time when the cultural vigor of the Arabs had practically
vanished. The Seljuk Turks of a thousand years ago, and later,
the Ottomans who conquered Constantinople were caught in
the patterns of urban life which had come to characterize the
Arabs after the rise of Islam. Later, with the decay of the sultan-
ate and of the Ottoman-directed caliphate, came the increase
in westernizing and europeanizing influences. This culminated
in the rise of the Kemalist movement and the development,
following World War I, of a Turkey limited in territory and
institutionally structured toward Europe (Spencer, 1958). The
Turks are late converts to Islam and its way of life and it is
not until the nineteenth century that European traditions make
themselves felt in any force. As a result of such temporal margin-
ality, the Turks avidly preserve what comes to them; they do
not themselves make significant contributions of their own.

With this kind of cultural background, it may not be un-
expected that there would be a drastic series of changes in
Turkish peasant culture as a result of the social engineering of
the period of Atatürk. To some extent there have been such
but they are not quite so far-reaching as might be anticipated.
In the cities and towns of modern Turkey there is, not unex-
pectedly, a marked suggestion of modernism. (And at times,
what with speculation and peculation, a modernism "gone
wild".) But it is patently absurd to assume, as a recent study
has done, that because some urban Turks read newspapers,
attend the cinema, have bank accounts, or are capable of think-
ing an idea or two on the Turkish effort in Korea, Turkish
traditional culture and society must succumb to arrant individual-
ism in the sense of the industrialized West.[2] Turkish society today,

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[2] cf. Daniel Lerner et al., *The Passing of Traditional Society. (Moderniz-
ing the Middle East.)* Glencoe, Ill., The Free Press, 1958. This pointless
study is fittingly reviewed by John Gulick, *American Anthropologist* 61:135-
138, 1959.

whether rural or urban, has a long way to go before it sheds its relations to the past. There is a social structure which pretty effectively militates against a culture change productive of total dissolution. To observe only the aspects of culture change, the effects of the Kemalist program and the advent of modernism in its many forms, is to be led astray.

The overt aspects of culture change in modern Turkey are of course present for all to see. In the cities, there are economic changes and in the countryside, if the rural Turk has been affected somewhat less by the economic aspects of modern urbanism, he has been touched deeply in many other ways. Within the space of a generation he has seen a change in the structure of Islam, a revolutionary blow dividing church from state. He has been obliged to change his costume, adopting western dress and headgear, and he has been forced to take a surname. He has had to submit to a system of education couched in the scientific terms of the West and he has had to learn to write in an alphabet of Latin rather than Arabic origin. He has sent his sons away for service in a modern military organization. His days of the week have changed, his calendrical year as well. He has watched his women vote and he has perhaps felt helpless that he could not divorce an annoying or shrewish wife by the threefold repetition of formula. At first glance, Atatürk's modernizing revolution set the Turkish world upside down.

The modern Turk, whether peasant or city dweller, has been drawn more and more into an awareness of his patriotic identity. In the village, the community center, the school, increasingly, the communication of radio and newspaper, combine to increase the awareness of one's identity as Turk and patriot. But despite the attempts of a paternalistic government to draw the citizen into closer rapport with itself, it has been confronted with a traditional core of social structure and with an essential stability of society, particularly of peasant society. Among the Turkish peasantry, the concept of family remains of paramount consideration. There is the persistence of traditional patterns so that the rural family especially, although this by no means omits gentry and urban familial and kinship groupings, still possesses a good deal of the flavor of classic Turkism, both that of Central Asia and that furthered by Muslim law.

How this family system works in its formal and structural aspects can best be analyzed by a consideration of the kinship terminologies employed in Turkish. Kinship systems have been fairly extensively treated for the various Turks and Mongols of Central Asia. (cf. Aberle, 1953; Bacon, 1958; Barth, 1953; Vreeland, 1953; *et al.*) But there seems no description in the literature of the kinship forms extant among the Oğuz Turks, those of Southwest Asia and Anatolia. The linguistic ties between these and the remoter Turks of Asia may expectedly produce cognate and analogous terminologies. Apart from this, however, the nature of the kinship system which stands thus revealed linguistically is accommodating and supple. It relates to Asiatic nomadism, it fitted precisely into Muslim family law, and it continues to have a place in the purely modern setting. This is the pliable structure which Professor Elizabeth Bacon has called the *obok,* the implications of which may be considered below. As to the kinship system itself, the Anatolian nomads, the rural agriculturalist, the semi-urban and urban shopkeeper make use of it, all essentially in the same way and all comprehending the same general structure.

As the kinship terms of modern Turkish are reviewed, however, there is some suggestion of complexity. This arises largely out of the linguistic acculturation to which Anatolian Turkish has been subjected. Through the centuries, literary models were Arabic and Persian and even if nationalist efforts at language reform have from time to time rooted out lexical loans, many foreign elements remain in Turkish speech (Spencer, 1958:644-45). Nor are the kinship terms free of Persian and Arab synonyms. Actually, this is not necessarily complicating since these do not change the essential character of the system. Such terms, moreover, are largely literary. The system, as may be noted, consists of a primary series of nuclear terms subjected to little or no qualifying modification. The presence of synonyms for the various terms reflects literary and polite usage and reference as against address as well. While usage is very important, and may be treated in detail in another context elsewhere, stress is placed here on the primary structure of the system and attention given largely to referential kinship designations.

Of the terms which follow, those which are primary, i.e. unmodified Turkish, reflecting neither metaphor, circumlocution,

nor borrowing, either directly or in loan translation, are designated with asterisk (*).[3] It is from a consideration of these that some sense of the structure of Turkish kinship groupings will emerge. Since parallel and synonymous terms are so frequent, however, it seems best to include them. The following abbreviations are employed for convenience: F—Father; M—Mother; B—Brother; Ss—Sister; Sb—Sibling; S—Son; D—Daughter; Ch—Child; H—Husband; W—Wife; o—Older; y—Younger; A—Arabic; P—Persian.

Turkish Kinship Terms:

F	*baba, *ata, peder (P), eb(u) (A)
M	*anne, *ana, valide (A)
FF, MF	*dede, ağababa, büyük baba
FM, MM	*nine, cicianne, haminne, büyük ana (FM baba-anne MM anne-anne)
FFF, FMF, MFF, MMF	*dede, büyük dede, descriptive, dedemin babası (GrandFF)
FFM, FMM, MFM, MMM	*nine, büyük nine, etc.
FFFF	ced (ancestor), cedat
FB, FFB, MFB	*amca, emmi (A)
MB, FMB, MMB	*dayı
FSs, FFSs, MFSs	*hala
MSs, FMSs, MMSs	*teyze
oB	*ağa (archaic), *ağabey > abi
oSs	*abla, bacı
ySb	*kardeş
S	*ogul
D	*kız
SS, DS, SD, DD	*torun, hafit (A)
SSS, etc.	torunun çocuğu, torunoğlu, etc.
SbCh	*yeğen

The foregoing terms relate, as may be seen, to the lineal ascendants and descendants and to the collaterals of the first degree. A fuller discussion of the sibling relationship, necessary here, points to the presence of loan words to designate both brother and sister, regardless of age in relation to Ego, while there is also present a means of denoting the ordinal position of siblings younger than Ego. The general terms are birader (P), B, and hemşire (A), Ss. Turkish büyük, ortanca, and küçük, as modifiers preceding kardeş, (ySb), designate eldest, middle, and youngest. Suggested here, too, are the terms referring to half- and step-relationships, aspects of significance when Muslim polyg-

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[3] Modern Turkish spelling has been used throughout. The ordinary "i" has been substituted for the Turkish undotted "ı" which is used following all back vowels—and also after "a". Furthermore, all non-English words except those of Turkish and Turk-Arabic origin are italicised.

yny is recalled. The üveykardeş relationship, that of the half-sibling, refers mainly to the fact of a common mother; a common father creates the özkardeş ("real") or kankardeş ("blood") relationship. In summary, the terms relating to the siblings are fairly extensive.

Those designating the more remote collaterals, however, are less easily rendered. Modern urban usage, but clearly not the rural, has borrowed the French kuzen *(cousin)* and kuzin *(cousine)*. It may be mentioned in passing that büyük baba, above, is a loan translation of French *grand-père,* or suspectedly so. In native Turkish, there are properly no cousin terms. A descriptive device is fairly common for purposes of reference. This is the suffix—zade, "issue", "son of —". Hence, Ego may readily designate the FBS as amcazade, the FSsCh as halazade, the MBCh as dayızade, etc. It is in respect to the collaterals, however, that the Turkish system begins basically to resemble that of various Turks and Mongols of Central Asia. Admittedly, the same degree of elaboration present in the so-called "stair-step" terminology of the Kazak, the Khalka Mongols, and particularly, of the Chahar Mongols (cf. Bacon, 1958:76-79; Vreeland, 1953:57ff., 312-13), or the sense of a sliding lineage system such as is encountered among the Kalmuk (Aberle, 1953:6-9) appear only as suggestions among the modern Turks. It does seem, even with fairly fragmentary or residual use of this type of kinship designation, that it represents the historic pattern, one which becomes modified with the abandonment of the traditional nomadic existence. "Stair-step" evidence may be noted in the following:

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Amca (FFB)————————————————Dede (FF)
  |                                    |
Amcazade (FFBS)      Amca (FB)————Baba (F)
                        |              |
                     Amcazade (FBS)   Ego
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
Theoretically, any collateral may be so defined through the point of relationship at the level of the parents' siblings. The son of the mother's brother, MB dayı, for example, would regularly be dayızade and the term conceptually refers to MMBS, FMBS, FFMBS, etc. And while the same pattern can be said to apply to the terms hala (FSs) and teyze (MSs), as in halazade and

teyzezade, in practise it does not. A speaker might refer to a dayızade for purposes of exact reference, but it is only the amcazade which is significant. There seems no sense for "stair-step" terminology with any term but amca.

Actually, this is not surprising in view of the implications which the system has for a primary lineage organization and the added element of preferential mating with the parallel cousin. In other words, in keeping with Muslim tradition, not to mention the marriage practises of pagan Central Asia, the tradition among the Turks has been toward *bint 'amm*, i.e. parallel cousin, marriages, first preference being accorded to the daughter of the father's brother (cf. Barth, 1953, 1954; Spencer, 1952:487-88). While the modern Turks remark that such marriages occur only in remoter rural areas today, there is clearly the sense for them and they bear out the impression of the kind of spiralling kinship system of male lineages subject to constant revitalization.

The following affinal terminology throws the consanguineal picture into some sharper focus:

H	*koca, zevc (A), eş
W	*karı, refika (A), eş
FBW, MBW, BW	*yenge (i.e., any woman married to a close relative)
FSsH, MSsH, SsH	*enişte (i.e., any man married to a close relative)
WF, HF	kayınbaba, kaynata, kayınpeder
WM, HM	kayınanne, kaynana, kayınvalide
WB, HB	*kayın, kayınbirader, kayınco (if younger than Ego, çelebi)
WSs	*baldız
HSs	*görümce
WSsH	*bacanak (reciprocal with Ego)
HBW	*elti (reciprocal with Ego)
SW, BSW, SsSW	*gelin
DH, BDH, SsDH	*damat, güvey
SWF	*dünür (reciprocal with Ego)
SWM	*dünüşü (reciprocal with Ego, a female)

As a final note to affinal terminology, the wives of a single man in a polygynous situation are referred to as ortak, "share-holder". Ego designates the wives of his father, other than his own mother, as üveyanne, step- or foster mother, although the sense seems to be toward a "half-mother", just as in the case of a half-sibling. He addresses his father's wives, those senior to his own mother, as cicianne, a familiar "grandmother" term of address. He can employ the MSs term, teyze, or name for those younger than his mother.

The foregoing consanguineal and affinal series present a not unfamiliar alignment of terms in which several principles stand out distinctly. Age and generation are clearly factors, the element of complexity appearing in the loss of the strict generation designation in the "stair-step" usages applied to FB categories. Sex is also a factor, since one differentiates the sex of those older than one's self, employing neuter terms for those younger except in the case of lineal descendants. The system brings out the primary emphasis on lineal ascent and descent, although again when comparison is made with terms in other Turkic social systems, a somewhat greater stress on the reckoning of lineal ascendants might be expected. Properly speaking, the designation of FF and SS bounds the picture. FFF is rendered by the FF term, while a circumlocution is necessary for the SSS term and those below. Above the FF generation one encounters ced, ancestor. In summary, the primary stress in the system is laid on five generations, two ascending and two descending from the point of view of Ego. Only those collaterals in the generations of the parents, of Ego, and Ego's child are specifically denoted. Terms can be extended to involve other collaterals but except in the case of amca, the feeling seems to be against it. In respect to affinal terms, great care is taken to offer quite exact expression of relationship. As the affinal terms are examined, however, they are seen to involve two aspects: the delimitation of affined kin who are associated with those precisely defined in the consanguineal relationships, and the reciprocal designations established by virtue of marriage, e.g., men married to two sisters become bacanak to each other. In other words, the group surrounding Ego in immediate proximity is most exactly defined. Precision of definition ceases at once; there is no gradual swing to a wider circle, one defined in terms of a series of remoter kinship designations.

The problem of the Turkish family thus rests in how this is put together and works as a system. What has been described is generally termed by the Arabic 'ā'ila, rendered in Turkish as aile. The aile is the conceptual group of co-residents, whether in a household, a village, or in the past as well as some Anatolian areas today, in the nomadic band. It is the unit of cooperative kinship which functions as the primary element in concerted group action in whatever direction or for whatever purpose. In

structural terms, this is the fundamental element in Turkish society.

From this level of the aile, it is possible to move out widely into the considerations of genealogy and extended kinship. Like other Turks and like the Bedouin of the desert, the modern Turks still retain the feeling of tribe or at least of some affiliation to a larger unit. Such kabile, to employ one term referring to a wide group (A. *qabilah*, "tribe"), can only depend on a sense of genealogy and descent from a common ancestor. With settled life in Turkey this consideration began to assume less importance, although the presence of terms in modern Turkish, such as soy-sop, the totality of one's relationships in the aile and beyond, or the borrowed Arabic *sülâle*, referring to the concept of patri-lineage, suggest the wider descent circle. But the aile remains the primary functional unit. As may be noted, it is definable from the point of view of Ego only since the trend is to drop a genera-tion as well as to realign, with Ego, all collateral relationships. In other words, Ego and his father have different aile.

The question thus arises, what is the aile, the group so defined in terms of relationship designations? To return to a point raised above, Professor Elizabeth Bacon, in considering parallel instances of social organization in Eurasia, has suggested the use of the term *obok* to denote a structure of this kind. She has indicated the presence of segmented lineage structures and fol-lowed the structural leads of Evans-Pritchard's Nuer study in evaluating this phenomenon in Eurasia. The Mongol term *obok* is useful, although one wonders if it will come into general ethnological use to describe segmented lineages. The segmented lineage is a flexible kinship unit in which territory, mobility within territory, descent, and primary stress on a functional family group are paramount. The Turkish aile is such a unit even if, generally speaking, the Turks have given up nomadic mobility and may in the majority be found in rural villages. The aile segment is not a clan. It is unilineal only to a degree, the kinship terminologies themselves indicating the classification of grandparental terms and the clear distinction made between the siblings of the parents. This would point, to use Bacon's term, to an ambilineality (Bacon, 1958:177-185). If this is so, then the question of endogamy versus exogamy need not arise. There is, it is true, parallel cousin marriage, or at least a feeling for

it as is traditional in Islam. The system indicates the worth of descent rather than the question of marriage and its involvements. The Turkish evidence would support Bacon's thesis that this type of social structure is highly flexible and permits readaptation to differing historical circumstances. In respect to Turkish society, this general pliability seems to hold. It is a society which adapts to settled life and it seems to combine elements from two culture areas—the nomadic Central Asiatic and the Southwest Asiatic desert.

Does this ability of the segmented lineage to readapt itself still hold? One might expect considerable modification in the face of the Atatürk reforms. To some extent there is change and a trend to families of the European type, conjugal units in one household. The edict of 1934, requiring the assumption of family names, when brothers might take different surnames, had a far-reaching effect in changing the traditional system. And of course, the movement to cities and towns with growing industry makes for a change in the system. Robinson notes at Alışar, an Anatolian village, that people who make some money in town are reluctant to return to the village and to reassociate themselves with their extended lineage system (Robinson, 1955). In short, there are changes but they are not yet such as to disrupt the system; it is still functioning.

Modern Turkish kinship, as is suggested earlier in the present paper, reflects the close face to face relationships which have come to be regarded as characteristic of folk societies. The problem which arises at once, however, that there are at hand no adequate mechanisms of appraisal or research by which the folk culture or society can be evaluated. Such cultures and societies, as conceived by most observers today, are those of Western civilization in the main, reflecting a rural peasantry worked on by the urbanizing and industrialized influences emanating from some definable focus which radiates a change-producing energy. One expects the Mexican or Italian countryman to behave like a product of Western culture and for all the by-blows and variables of history, he does. Thomas and Znaniecki's Poles and Tax's penny capitalists may differ in social structure from each other but as Western men, sharing a core of common culture and tradition, they are much alike. On this basis, it has been assumed that the gentry-peasant, urban-rural, industrial-non-

industrial facets of society in Japan, China, India or wherever may be evaluated in terms of the European peasant. This fails to take into account the fundamental difference in cultures or to evaluate the specific nature of the cultural backgrounds. Folk culture has been a happy rubric but it begins to appear that when the anthropologist steps out of the familiar precincts of Western culture, he is not evaluating folk cultures; he is doing ethnography. The difference is subtle, but real for all that. Turkey, so Western and yet so alien, yet requires a series of pointed ethnographic analyses.

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A DEATH AND A YOUTH CLUB: FEUDING IN A TURKISH VILLAGE

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The primary aim of this paper is to describe two events which occurred during my second field trip to Turkey,[1] to offer some analysis of them, and to raise one or two general questions. The analysis requires also a description, which I have sought to make complete, if brief, of the patrilineal groups found in these villages.

Folkhead, the village in which I lived on this trip, was fairly large — about 1200 people, living in about 215 households. One afternoon in November, one of the wealthier villagers had invited me to drink coffee in his own guest room. Most of the middling and more prosperous households have a room, usually well away from the family part of the house and the women, which is specially reserved for the men of the household; it is generally known as *oda*, the ordinary Turkish word for *room*. Here the men sit and talk, and entertain their guests. As we finished drinking coffee, we heard a child crying grievously outside. We went out of the room on to the stone platform at the head of the outside staircase which leads up to it. A girl was running into the courtyard of the next house shouting out, "Çocuk vurdular." Literally, this might mean "They have struck a child," and I did not at once realize what she meant. "Dead, dead," shouted the girl as she disappeared into her house. She had been telling us that a young man had been shot.

The victim, head of a household and father of a young family, had recently returned from military service. He had been shot by a young neighbor, and had died within a few minutes, right outside the guest room of the current village headman.[2] Women

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[1] In 1949 and 1950, I spent about nine months in a village of central Turkey of roughly 100 households, and 640 people, which I here call Blackrock. In 1951, I spent three months in a second village, not far from the first, here called Folkhead, to which I returned for about six weeks in the summer of 1952. Blackrock was fairly remote and poor; Folkhead was richer, more sophisticated, and larger than most villages in the area. I paid a further flying visit to both villages in the summer of 1955.

[2] Headmen are elected every two years, and very rarely stand for office for a second term.

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were wailing and screaming and gesticulating wildly round the corpse, while a solemn group of men stood by watching, and occasionally trying fruitlessly to restrain them. The murderer had made off; apparently countershots had been fired, but unsuccessfully, and by this time no one seemed concerned to pursue him — that was left to the authorities.

After a while, we retired to the headman's guest room which was close by. The dead lad's father sat in grim silence, while the father's brother sobbed and trumpeted, shouting the name of the dead youth. A younger brother was also crying violently, and for a short while even a woman who had refused to leave the body was brought in to calm down.

In spite of these disturbances, conversation proceeded. The men sitting round discussed what had happened, and when the doctor would come. They praised the excellence of the young man — only his friends and kinsmen were present. There was a marked sense of shock — "A vile and outrageous act," they said. It was so sudden. "If only there had been a quarrel, insults flying, and fighting," they kept repeating. Nevertheless, the blame was not put on the murderer's shoulders. In the villages they were used to this sort of thing. "A barbarous people." "Our life is rotten." People condemned their village freely. They saw the killing as a part of the village way of life.

The next day, a doctor and other officials arrived and carried out a formal inquiry, and the corpse was buried. The young murderer was arrested in a day or so in another village, and put in jail. He was eventually sentenced to ten years imprisonment. For a day or two the atmosphere in the village was tense with fear of reprisal, but things slowly returned to a sort of sombre normal, and three years later no reprisal had taken place.

Acts of violence in Turkish villages are fairly common. People are quick to resent insult, and most adult men are armed with knives or revolvers. I heard of many cases during my field work. In this village another fight took place shortly after I left, and led to shooting, though the victim recovered. In Blackrock, between my first visit in 1949 and 1953, there had been to my knowledge two killings and three woundings. Reports from other local villages and from other parts of Turkey indicate that these two villages are by no means exceptional. The description and analysis of this particular quarrel may therefore throw some

light on a more general problem, namely the social conditions which lie behind these acts of violence. But first I must outline village social structure.

Everyone in the countryside in this area must be a member of at least two kinds of groups — village (*köy*) and household (*ev* or *hane*). Villages are distinct clusters of houses, separated from each other by anything from half an hour to two hours' walk over bare, unfenced fields, — often broken by rocky, sharp escarpments or even mountains. Each village is composed of patrilineally organized households. Normally, married sons live in their father's household so long as he is alive, and brothers often remain together for a while afterwards. Men rarely migrate from village to village.

Within the village, the men of these households form patrilineal kinship groups, which with hesitation I call lineages. They are not of very wide span — the effective group usually consists of households whose heads acknowledge a common ancestor two or three generations above the senior living generation. In Blackrock, with about 100 households in all, the largest effective lineage was twenty households strong. Seven others, ranging from four to ten households strong, showed some solidarity. The remaining thirty-four households had no agnatic affiliation beyond a fraternal household or two. For Folkhead where my information is less comprehensive, the situation, proportionate to size, was similar. AY lineage, of which I give the details below, was the largest lineage at nineteen households.

These lineages have no formal constitution. They are not legal or jural persons, — they own nothing in common, they have no common ritual corresponding to totem or ancestor worship, and they are not exogamous. They do have names, and there is a village word for this type of group — *kabile*, the Istanbul Turkish word for a tribe, taken from Arabic, — but they have no other symbols of unity. It has been suggested that the term 'corporate group' is a tautology,[3] and in strict logic this makes sense. Yet it also makes sense to say of these groups that they are not corporate,[4] but depend rather on the duties which the

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[3] Remarks of Professor Daryll Forde in a seminar.
[4] See Fortes (1953:25) for a discussion of the "corporate" nature of unilineal groups. Evans-Pritchard (1940:203) remarks, however, that Nuer lineages are not corporate.

individual members owe each other as patrikin. These duties are many and complex, but one overrides all the others — a man must support all members of his lineage in any quarrels and fights in which they are involved. Other duties, such as help in times of economic crisis or in sickness, or help with marriage arrangements and expenses, may be given to near kin who are not members of the lineage, but the obligation to fight on each other's behalf is confined to lineage members. Of course, any men present at a fight are clearly liable to join in, but if they do so, then it is ad hoc, out of friendly zeal or passing anger, and not a matter of duty; and they risk embroiling their own lineage in the quarrel.

If a man is in trouble with his neighbors, his patrikin will come to his aid, and in doing so, will be acting together as a group. But it is not only at times of open fighting that this situation occurs. Quiescent hostility is normal in the villages. For this, the villagers use a word 'küs,' by which they mean a sort of mutual sulking. It implies the state of mind of Achilles in his tent, — one has been wronged or insulted, and broken off normal social relationships. The negative of *küs* is 'to speak to each other'; to say "We are speaking to each other" (*konuşuyoruz*) may sometimes mean "We have been reconciled." Any self-respecting lineage is more than likely to be *küs* with at least one other similar group.

The lineage exists to defend its members. When in Blackrock, I once suggested migration to distant parts of Turkey as a solution to land poverty, they at once said: "But if we quarrelled, who would come to our aid?" But at the same time, the existence of the lineage depends on its having enemies against which to defend its members; since it has no other occasion for corporate action. A lineage at peace with its neighbors would lose the main point of its existence.

Not all households are effective members of lineages, and not all lineages take their solidarity seriously. In societies where unilineal groups are more important than they are here, it may be impossible to survive without the support of a powerful lineage to defend one's rights. But in these villages, many households are isolated. This isolation may result from one or more of a number of causes; namely the dying out of collateral branches, genealogical remoteness from, or simply lack of interest in one's

agnates, active quarrelling with them, or migration to a new village.

Households which have lost all their close agnates may become relatively prosperous, by inheriting a sufficiency of good land; though prosperity also depends on the size and industry of the household. Sometimes a poor or slow-witted man will ignore agnates if they are not very close, or they will ignore him. Quarrels between very close agnates, though common, do not usually become permanent, especially if the lineage is under pressure from outside. I did record one case where a man, claiming membership of a large lineage with which he had quarrelled, was left to shoot it out with another large lineage supported only by his own sons.

Most migrants between villages move into their mother's village, and marry her brother's daughter or other close kinswoman, and in these cases sometimes seem to be regarded more or less as full members of her lineage. In Folkhead, there were two immigrant households which had no local kin ties at all, and there were also about fifteen households of refugees from eastern Turkey, who had been living in the village at least since the Russian invasion in the first World War. Among these are now groups of households whose heads are brothers, and the whole group is sometimes spoken of as 'the refugees.' Most of them live in the same quarter, and tend to intermarry rather more with each other than with the old established village households. But they are not equivalent to a lineage, although they contain the beginnings of several separate lineages.

It is mainly poor households which seem to avoid lineage responsibilities and do without lineage support. Many poor households belong to small groups of brothers or brothers' sons, and one or two lineages of considerable size whose members are all poor and of low social rank do not appear to take their lineage membership seriously. On the other hand, large and effective lineages always seem to include a number of middling or poor households, clustered round and supporting close agnates of greater power and wealth.[5]

To say that the effective group normally has a common ancestor no more than three generations above the senior living

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[5] The reason for this lies in the effects of household fission and egalitarian inheritance rules. This matter will be dealt with in a future publication.

generation is not to say that they do not know of more remote
agnatic links.   AY and AX (see genealogy), for example, are
part of a common patrilineal stock, which they claim now num-
bers more than sixty households in all. In several other cases,
I was given a list of five or so ancestors above the living, going
back to the man who had come to the village and founded the
patrilineal stock. But this information was often difficult to get,
and clearly not felt to be of much importance.

The large stock A is typical in everything but its unusual
size. It contained 48 households without question, according to
my census of the village. Although some branches had moved
away to the outskirts, the original quarter of the village which
belonged to it still contained the majority of its member house-
holds. AY, though I have called it one effective lineage, was
divided into two segments, one AYp, consisting of eight house-
holds, and the other, AYq, of ten. The group seemed to be led
mainly by the brothers AY1 to AY4, and all AYp seemed to
support them. Many members of AYq also associated closely
with them, but not all — the estimate of nineteen households is
based on genealogical completeness, not on certainty that all
these people would in fact fight for AY in a quarrel.

AX's genealogical link to AY1 did not discover, and though
it was fairly close, they were very definitely distinct social groups.

Besides these two main segments, there were a number of other
small groups. One set of two well-to-do brothers, plus a son
separated from his father, and a brother's son, appears to have
been *FFFSSS* to AY1, but seemed fairly aloof. There was an-
other group of five households, consisting of three fairly poor
brothers (who had been brought up by their mother's brother),
their brother's son, and a father's brother's son who seemed to
have little to do with them. Another group of four agnatically
inter-connected households, who also seemed aloof, were of the
same patrilineal ancestry as, and neighbors to, the main group.
Two other sets of poor brothers and one odd household also
belonged, but were either ignorant of their agnatic link to the
other groups, or else were not interested in it. Besides these, a
set of six households claiming close and definite agnatic connec-
tions between themselves, were said by some to belong and by
others not to belong to the same stock. The evidence was con-
tradictory, the statements of informants being clearly influenced

AY LINEAGE

(P branch)

=O (Fs to
Elletc.)

△ 1

△ 2

△ 3

△ 4 (Head-man)

O = △ (Mehmet, C3)

O = △ (AY9)

△ 5

O = △ (AY7)

O = △ (AY9)

△ 6

△ 7

△ 8 (betrothed to d. of AX1)

(Q branch)

= O (sis. of AY5)

△ 9 = O (d. of AY5)

△ 10 = O

= O (d. of B9)

△ = O (d. of AY6)

△ 11

△ 12

△ (lives with 12, unmarried)

△ 13

△ 14

△ 15

△ 16

△ 17

△ = O (d. of AY8)

△ 18

△ (Urban teacher)

AX LINEAGE

B LINEAGE

C. LINEAGE

LEGEND

Black indicates dead members.
Two or three lines leading from a man indicate the progeny of different mothers.
Women are only included where they are of relevance to the dispute.
Lines without symbols on the right hand side indicate young children.
Numbers indicate heads of households.
Dotted lines indicate either doubt or fictional genealogical connections.
S. = son.
d. = daughter.
sis. = sister.

by current relations of friendship or hostility. In any case, no one was greatly interested in the matter. These fifty odd households then did not constitute a social group, in spite of their agnatic connections, and many of them belonged to no effective lineages at all.

The segmentation, and ultimately complete fission, of agnatically related groups is normally gradual. Since lineages have no formal constitution, there is no definite criterion by which one can say that a former lineage has now become two. Clearly segmentation along the genealogical lines is normal — that is, a lineage with three sets of brothers who are FBS to each other would tend to operate as three related groups rather than as one undifferentiated group. Increasing genealogical distance, physical separation due to change of house sites, and the non-occurrence over a period of events in which all have a common interest or duty all weaken lineage ties, and in the end lead to total fission. Specific quarrels such as that between AX and AY cause a sudden and more definite break. But in most cases I came across, quarrels between agnates, however common, were unlikely to be accepted as beyond hope of reconciliation unless the genealogical distance was such as to justify total fission.

So far, I have said only that the main duty of lineage members to each other is that of fighting on each other's behalf. To observe exactly who fights on a given occasion would be extremely difficult, and in any case, I never actually witnessed a fight. My estimate, therefore, as to who acknowledges lineage loyalty and who does not is bound to be impressionistic. Since people may in fact feel mutual loyalty without showing much mutual cordiality, this is not always reliable, but sufficient of these estimates are based on good evidence adequately to support my general argument. Only those households who are themselves sufficiently important to contend for power, or who are agnatically close to such households, constitute effective lineages engaged in more or less continuous quarrels.

Defence in quarrels is not the only mutual duty of agnates. Lineage members are expected to help each other in distress from sickness, crop failure or other disaster. They attend in force at each other's weddings and funerals, and assist with the expense and chores. They are often close neighbors, and associate informally, especially in sitting together at seasons of leisure in the

guest room of one of the better off members of the lineage. At
religious festivals, they often do their visiting, sacrificing or enter-
taining together. But in none of these respects does the lineage
act as a body. The group which is helping a man to celebrate
a wedding, or bury a corpse, or help an ailing man out with his
harvest will contain, besides a core of near agnates, other kin
and neighbors.

Agnates are expected to give each other their daughters in
marriage. As in many other Islamic societies, FBd is said to be
the preferred marriage partner, and people sometimes talk and
behave as though a man had a right to the first option on his
FBd. But in these villages only about 10% of the marriages of
which I hold records were with a FFBSd or closer agnate. Such
marriages are both a symptom and a reinforcement of lineage
solidarity. The effect is to overlay existing relations with even
more intimate ones. Hence the overall structural consequences
of a small percentage of marriages within the lineage is slight.
On the other hand, marriages outside the lineage, which either
create new links with other lineages or re-establish old ones, es-
tablish a network of ties between lineages very much as do mar-
riages in societies with exogamous lineages.[6]

A senior member of a lineage may have considerable influence
— indeed, it is plain that such a group must have some kind of
leadership. But outside the authority of an elder brother over
his juniors, which is sometimes very marked, lineage leadership
is informal, and divided counsels may be unresolvable. The dis-
pute in AX lineage over the bethrothal of AX1's daughter in
the story which follows is a good example.[7] Moreover, a well-
to-do man in Blackrock who did not have the support of a large
lineage, built up a body of rather less committed supporters from
among his matrilateral and affinal kin, a process which in turn
weakened the lineage affiliation of those supporters. Notably,
he claimed to be a man of peace, who quarrelled with no one.
Could he afford to?

To sum up, then, lineages are groups of households which will
combine for mutual support in serious quarrels and fights. The
genealogical range of membership is variable, but the group is

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[6] See e.g., Fortes (1953).
[7] See p. 67 below.

always united. The members, in view of their agnatic kinship, owe each other many duties besides this support. But it is quarrelling which maintains the lineage, not because quarrels are the only situations where lineage ties are active, but because they are the only occasions when lineage ties are active to the exclusion of all other ties, and when failure to carry out obligations is tantamount to rejection of lineage membership.

Each of the four lineages involved in the quarrel I am about to describe fits the general description I have just given. Each has a central local cluster, each has a guest room where most members of the lineage can be found foregathered on a winter evening, each is involved in quarrels, each contains one or two households of wealth and consequence, and each looks after its own in trouble.

On the attached genealogies I have only put in marriages where these are known to me to bear directly on the relationships between the lineages, or where they are within the lineage. Since my information on marriages in this village was far from exhaustive, I cannot say that all marriages of these two classes are included, but most of the marriages which I have not noted can be assumed to be with people not directly concerned in this particular matter, very often with people from other villages.

The frequency of visiting and co-operation which resulted from the existing intermarriages between the various parties to the quarrel naturally declined as a result of the open breach, but they were not forgotten and were felt to make matters even more deplorable. Both sides pointed out to me the connections between AX and C, and also that B11 was mother's brother to AY1 to 4.

Some kind of quarrel between AX and AY seems to have been going on for years. The evidence is scrappy, and some of what follows is perhaps 'conjectural history,' but I have sought to indicate clearly the degree of confidence I feel in the statements I make.

The village has several stories of great men of the past, men who have been in charge of the district of which the village is still the administrative centre. One of these was the father of B11, who spent his wealth going on the pilgrimage to Mecca and died poor, leaving his heirs with very little. The last of the great men was Kara Osman. I met him when he came from his own village to visit some pilgrims who returned from Mecca to

Blackrock during my first field trip. He was said 'to have held the whole district in his hand.' I gather he was a sort of semi-official boss of the immediate area during the disturbed period after the 1918 peace. He died, unfortunately, just before I arrived to do field work in his village.

The poor of the village spoke well of him, and he was quoted as having simplified some details of the village marriage customs merely by setting the example himself. His house was far and away the most pretentious in the village, and he was rich by village standards. He had acquired far more land than anyone else in the village simply by ploughing it when a large village whose lands lay adjacent to his own was evacuated by its Christian population during the exchange of population with Greece (1923 onwards). He is said to have employed much labor in former days. He also bought farm machinery when it was still very rare in this part of Turkey, and each year used to take it and hire it out in the fertile and early harvested Cilician plain south of the Taurus. People often said to me, that, after him, the village had no real *ağa,* but only half a dozen or so pretenders to such standing.[8]

Part of the dispute between AX and AY was to do with the revolt against his power — at least that is my reading of the events. My reason for believing this is partly based on national politics.

Up to 1946, Turkey was ruled by a single party, the Republican People's Party. Elections did take place, but all candidates were members of the party, or at least approved by it. At this stage, most villagers did not understand the ideology of the revolution, and were not at all keen on being made to use the infidel script and wear the infidel hat. But they accepted as inevitable the acts of government, and they had deep respect for Atatürk, the Holy Conqueror of the invading Greek forces in the War of Independence (1919-22).[9] Once they had accepted the new government, their previous experience of government led the people to assume that all officials must be members of the ruling

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[8] *Ağa* (pronounced in Turkish, roughly, 'ah') is often, as here, used to mean a man of substance and importance. But it has many other uses; for example, it is a common form of address in the villages for any adult man.

[9] See especially Toynbee (1923); and Stirling (1958).

'party,'[10] and accordingly all headmen claimed to be supporters of the R.P.P. After 1946, an opposition party was allowed to form, and this began to organize in the villages, calling itself the Democratic Party—now in power in Turkey. In some villages, for example, in Blackrock, people regarded this new choice as a personal matter, and brothers and neighbors took opposite sides quite openly. But in other villages, of which Folkhead was one, existing factions took on party labels. The headman in office was usually R.P.P., because he and the village assumed it was necessary that he should be, and thus his supporters became R.P.P., while his opponents in the village, for local rather than national reasons, declared themselves supporters of the D.P.

In Folkhead, the headman in office in 1952, AY4, and his predecessor, were on good terms with each other, and were both supporters of the R.P.P. The village D.P. is led by the other side, B11 and AX2. These facts fit the above interpretation. Previously, B11's eldest son had been headman. During and before his tenure of the office, villagers had been ploughing up village pasture on a large scale. The lands are extensive, but only recently did improved transport and fixed prices lead villagers in large numbers to seek to plough more land than they needed for their own subsistence. In village custom, ploughing village pasture conferred the right to its use; nowadays, after twenty years, this right becomes legally confirmed. My informants describe something of a land rush about the time of the end of the war, which ended in fighting when a section of the village, including AY, objected to the loss of pasture for village animals, and tried to prevent their neighbors, who included AX, from encroaching any further. My surmise is that the split between AY and AX goes back at least to this trouble, and that AY and supporters succeeded in wresting the headmanship from Kara Osman and his faction at this point. At any rate, more fighting took place, with AX on one side and AY on the other, at the 1950 election for headman, when AY4 was elected. At or about this time, AX10 knifed AY3, in a general fight.

C lineage, as far as I know, was not tied up with this struggle. They had ties by marriage with both sides, and have a reputation for aloofness. True, they also appear to have acquired a com-

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[10] This was the first time most people had heard of political parties, and they used the word *parti*, which to the villagers at first meant *the rulers*.

fortable sufficiency of land at this point, by the same means, but then so did most village households which had men and oxen available to expand their normal activities. Successful acquisition would not necessarily involve their joining a dispute about the restriction of ploughing up pasture.

So much for the general background. Now let us turn to the immediate series of events. I have already mentioned the fighting at the election for headman in May 1950. In the autumn of that year, apparently, the main incident which led to the killing took place. Mehmet, the victim, was away on military service at the time. His wife and Yusuf (AX2's son) quarrelled over the washing of grain at the fountain. Yusuf struck the girl, and immediately her lineage took reprisals on a woman of his lineage. A general fight followed. In the spring, apparently, another fight had broken out, also, according to informants, started by Yusuf. No casualties occurred, it seems, on either occasion.

Soon after this flare up, the District Officer[11] brought the elders of the two sides together in his room, to eat a meal and make peace. Everyone shook hands, but the general relationship of *küs*[12] seems to have continued. However, the atmosphere did relax, and conciliation was under way. AX1, a senior member of his lineage, took the very great step of responding to overtures for marriage from AY8, and promised his daughter to AY8's son. (See genealogy) If it is true that marriage ties do not prevent the development of feuding relationships, it is also true that to negotiate a marriage one must be at peace, and be expecting the peace to continue.

In the meantime, Mehmet returned from military service, about one month before his death. He is said, with probability, to have told Yusuf what he thought of him, and to have threatened to take revenge for the insult to his wife. Yusuf would certainly have no grounds for supposing that such threats were purely empty. One way of communicating one's feelings on this kind of subject is to abuse with strong language any animal that

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[11] Turkish *Nahiye Müdürü*. This village was the administrative centre for about sixteen villages, that is, one educated townsman was in residence, and was responsible for the affairs of the district or *nahiye*. It also contained a gendarme post, with a corporal in charge.

[12] See above, page 54.

is within range in the hearing of one's enemy. The hearer cannot take exception without admitting the cap fits, but he and everyone else knows quite well for whom the insults are intended.

Three days before the murder, AY8 and his kin paid a formal betrothal visit to AX1. On their departure, Yusuf was lying in wait, and fired shots — not, it was said, with intent to kill, but simply into the air in the general direction of the departing guests, to indicate strong disapproval of the proceedings.[13] I was told by members of his lineage that he did this with their support. I cannot be sure of this, since they were anxious to whitewash his character after the event, but it seems plausible that he was aiming to express hostility of his lineage in general to the wedding as much as his own. It appears that AX1 was unmoved, and announced his intention to persist.

I received two contradictory accounts of the actual shooting. Yusuf's kin said that he was being chivvied and threatened by Mehmet and two of his agnates, and acted in self defense. The other side, supported by several neutral witnesses, claimed that Mehmet was quietly driving home his cattle and that Yusuf, who was standing by a wall, simply brought out a gun and fired at close range. It seems quite possible that Mehmet was addressing some uncomplimentary remarks to his oxen, knowing that Yusuf was in earshot.

During the days immediately before the shooting, Yusuf is said to have been behaving a little queerly, refusing work, and coming and going at unorthodox times. On the day in question, he had been to see the clerk of the local Credit Co-operative, an educated young man from the small local town, who was resident in the village, and who happened to be his kinsman. Yusuf announced to him, with considerable agitation, his intention of taking some sort of action to prevent the wedding, and this seems to have been a part of his aim. But if so, why pick on Mehmet? Mehmet was a personal enemy, and was brother-in-law and neighbor to AY1-4. He probably thought to kill two birds with one bullet, to break up the conciliatory wedding, and at the same time settle his private quarrel.

Why was Yusuf so opposed to reconciliation? If I am right in saying that lineage solidarity depends on the existence of active

[13] M. S. Salim (1955:129) reports a similar custom from the Marsh Arabs of Iraq.

quarrels, then peace might threaten the very coherence of the lineage. But more than this, I would say that a tough lineage carries a good deal more prestige than a peaceful one of equal wealth. A young man of nineteen might have very little standing in the village except what he gains from membership of an important lineage. If so, he would be most unwilling to see this group lose its prestige, even perhaps its solidarity as a unit, by making peace. From his point of view, his father's brother's negotiations for marriage with the enemy were not sensible and good, but traitorous. Moreover, although he was himself engaged to B11's daughter, the girl in question was his own preferred marriage partner, which gave a tenuous traditional right to raise objections to her marrying against his wishes. I do not of course know that he actually reasoned in these terms. Obviously, his anger about the reconciliation would be inarticulate, and complex in its origin. In general, Yusuf was probably aiming primarily to upset the peace overtures current in the village. This brings me back to my point that lineages not only protect their members from quarrels, but also tend to encourage quarrels from which they will need protecting.

The immediate reaction in the village in general was one of horror. Everyone was deeply distressed, and one heard people complaining continually, "The village is sunk." "The sweetness of the village is turned to sourness." The cold-bloodedness of the attack was much censured — high tempers and flying insults would have made the thing at least comprehensible, but this was so unexpected. I wonder if some of this moral indignation was not partly due to the influence of modernism — acquaintance with western notions, and consciousness of Turkey as one of the European nations. In deference to my presence, they even compared the British, who, according to popular belief based on the accounts of Turkish prisoners of war in British hands during the first World War, settle their arguments with fists instead of knives and revolvers. On the other hand, in a small community of intimately related kin and neighbors, such an act of violence is bound to provoke a strong sense of shock, and it may be that such a killing would always have provoked just such a reaction.

C lineage, to which the victim belonged, was and is by all accounts implacable. Both they themselves and all others in the village with whom I discussed the subject declared that sooner or

later vengeance was inevitable. They have in any case a repu-
tation for cold aloofness and determination. Twice just after
the event, in my presence, ordinary every-day comings and goings
were interpreted as a group attack by C lineage. But in any case,
such an open attack is not necessary. There is nothing to stop one
member of a village lying in wait for and shooting another mem-
ber of the same village, as Yusuf shot Mehmet. AX2 spoke to
me apparently seriously of a plan for leaving the village altogether,
and going to Ankara. I doubt if he would in fact do so. Vague
talk of leaving the villages may well be another standard reaction
to the threat of vengeance.[14]

I have already said that acts of violence are not infrequent in
these villages. If in each case, vengeance is liable to be exacted
in cold blood, then a good few people must walk in fear of their
lives. The price of belonging to a lineage of consequence is danger
of assassination. These feuds are not between sharply separated
territorial units, but in all cases I came across, they are within
the village. And moreover, in spite of constant inquiries I was
unable to unearth any evidence that there exists, or ever has ex-
isted, any recognized procedure for the settlement of homicide
disputes by compensation or any other means. It has been said,
and plausibly, that the existence of unsettled blood debts within
a small community is intolerable,[15] and that this is why so often
in primitive and peasant societies, some kind of settlement is
not only possible, but morally required. Yet it looks as though
we have here an exception, a case where people may be in per-
manent danger from their daily associates. Is there any expla-
nation?

I returned to the village about eight months after this event,
and found that it had led to an interesting series of consequences.
Here again, the details are not certain, but the main events are
fairly clear.

When I arrived back, I could not occupy the same room as
formerly. After much discussion, I was given a room in the
school belonging to what I was told was called the Youth Union
or Youth Club (*Gençlik Birliği*). This surprised me not a little.
Turks are not joiners, not even in the towns. Several commen-

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[14] He had made no move by 1955.

[15] e.g., Evans-Pritchard (1940:156) "Corporate life is incompatible with
a state of feud."

tators [16] have remarked on the remarkable scarcity of any purely spontaneous societies for recreational, social or any other purpose in Turkey. My own experience has confirmed this. Villagers had often told me cheerfully that they could never work together or trust each other, not even for economic gain.[17] Most associations, from national charities to village co-operatives, are begun by official initiative. Why then had this apparently ordinary village suddenly produced a Youth Club, all complete with the blessing of the local administration, a meeting room in the school, and a small library of edifying books on such topics as child psychology and poultry keeping?

From various informants I pieced together this account of the events. The winter is the season of weddings, when the harvest is over, and work is slack. Weddings are almost the sole form of village entertainment. At a respectable wedding by a household with sufficient means, the people of the village enjoy four or five days' dancing and tomfoolery, with distributions of coffee and sweets, ending in the climax of the last day's ceremonies. To my knowledge, a considerable number of weddings were fixed for this particular winter — the figure of 25 was mentioned.

A death in the village puts a temporary stop on weddings, since singing, drumming and dancing are taboo for a time after a death — a week or two. But not only do people sing and dance at weddings, they also let off fire arms. This is dangerous enough in the ordinary way, but with an implacable lineage supposedly thirsting for vengeance, it positively invited disaster. To have a murder done at one's wedding would be an appallingly inauspicious beginning to a new relationship, so it is not surprising that, even when the normal mourning period had elapsed, still no one dared to hold a wedding. This decision lay of course not with grooms, still less with brides, but with their fathers — the fathers of the grooms having the final say.

This stop on weddings was a serious matter. Holding up a wedding is risky — girls are never safe from the danger of scandal till properly married and aging parents need the help of

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[16] e.g., R. D. Robinson (1949), especially No. 37, 5th Sept. 1949.

[17] In fact, quite apart from traditional mutual aid, villagers are beginning to found joint economic enterprises — so far mainly motor driven flour mills, and lorry and bus services.

a new daughter-in-law, and want to see grandchildren in the home. The young men were missing their only form of organized merry-making. It seems that it was first and foremost a common desire to find a way to hold weddings that led to the founding of the Youth Club.

The president of the Youth Club added another motive. He talked a great deal about brotherly love. The young men, he said, were under pressure from their elders to continue the traditional enmities. He claimed that they revolted from this pressure, and sought to defeat the hatreds of the elder generation by a Youth Club dedicated to peace and goodwill. It is often and plausibly said that inter-lineage feuds are organized and encouraged by the senior members, and that young men are deputed to execute the deeds of violence because they are likely to get much lighter sentences in the courts. But I have not observed any lack of enthusiasm on the part of young men for feuds, and I doubt whether any general antipathy to quarrelling had much to do with the founding of the Youth Club.

Whatever the motive, it seems that the young men (*gençler*) — and that includes men up to about forty — organized a meeting, and, on the initiative of the man who became president, founded an association which then or later became known as the Youth Club. The main purpose of the Club was to make it possible to hold weddings in the village. They would approach 'the master of the wedding' (*düğün sahibi*), that is, normally, the father of the groom, and offer to take responsibility for good conduct at his wedding if he would hold it. The Club had about 100 members, and they divided themselves into eight groups, each under a leader, who were to take on so to speak, unofficial police duties, for one week each. I found a list giving the rota of duties from the middle of April to the middle of June, a period coinciding with the comparatively slack period from the end of the Spring ploughing to the beginning of the hay harvest; but the scheme may have got under way earlier in the year. This part of the plan apparently met with complete success — at least, weddings certainly took place, no deaths occurred, and no untoward incidents reached my ears.

The association insisted on all its members being reconciled, and they claimed that only C lineage refused to come in, or to have anything to do with the proceedings. Indeed, C lineage

were not, in the summer, even attending the village mosque, but worshipping at mosques in other villages. On the other hand, B11 had paid a formal visit to AY4, thus effecting a formal reconciliation between B and AY, and AX1's daughter was still betrothed to AY8's son.

Once under way, the Youth Club attempted other things. It arranged public labor — some of the village streets were improved, and some of the irrigation ditches cleaned out. It reached official ears, and the Club was duly allotted a room in the school, acquired a collection of suitable books and became part of official village improvement. The club room really appears to have functioned as a meeting place, and expenses were met by collections from members. Unfortunately during my brief stay in the summer, everyone was working on the harvest, and the Club was completely inactive. Some of its members assumed that it would take up where it left off with the return of winter; others expressed doubt.

The Club, in spite of its ostensibly beneficial aims and works, was not approved of by the older and more traditional members of the village. One head of a large household, when asked to give reasons for his strong disapproval, said that it was taking the young men away from their homes, where they were no longer available to carry out their fathers' orders. Others also commented that it encouraged insubordination in the young, while some refused to state reasons, simply saying that it was a bad thing. Some members said they had been charged with subversive political activities, though none of the opponents of the association ever admitted to me that such a charge could possibly have any foundation — which indeed it could not. At all events, it seems that public criticism of the club effectively stopped their public works program.

It is clear that a Youth Club of this sort is not an indigenous feature of village social structure. The wording of the arrangements for the weekly rota of duty was clearly based on the experience of the army which the universal conscription in Turkey gives to every young man. But was it a completely new attempt to solve the problem of an endless chain of vengeance in a small community, or does it reflect some traditional form of social control, using new forms which fit with the new termi-

nology and new values of officialdom? I know of no evidence which would suggest an answer to this question.

The blood feud is generally accepted to be a widespread phenomenon in modern Turkey, and the government is concerned to stamp it out. In this paper, I have sought only to illustrate some of the characteristics of feuding, and of the groups that carry it on, in the area in which I worked, by describing a particular case of homicide, and the remedy which the village improvised to deal with the situation created by it. The striking point about all the feuds of which I have knowledge is that they are conducted between members of one village, who are not territorially separate, and that therefore those who are quarrelling walk in fear of their lives, since their rivals may easily shoot them at any time. In spite of this apparently intolerable situation, no recognized or formal means of reconciling the feuding lineages seems to exist.

Information on the social organization of Turkish villages is scanty, even in the present. For the past, it seems likely that no adequate records exist at all.[18] Nothing I myself have read to date supplies any information which would solve this problem. But it seems beyond belief that this system of uncontrolled and unrestricted revenge has always existed in Turkish villages, or even in some Turkish villages. On the other hand, if some means of controlling feuds existed, and has now ceased to function and been forgotten, then it is surely probable that it was not an explicit institution of arbitration or compensation, for this would not be easily forgotten, but some indirect form of control, not recognized as such.

The power and importance of local leaders has certainly declined sharply with the modernization introduced by the Republic. For example, when a case of stealing occurred in Blackrock, and no action was taken, one of the old men remarked that in the old days the village elders would have forced a restitution of twice the value of any stolen property to the loser. People also often said that litigation in the courts had replaced

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[18] '. . . in all Moslem countries . . . the village . . . has hitherto been neglected. No Moslem writer in either mediaeval or modern times, has condescended to describe the organization of village life in his country. . . .' Gibb and Bowen (1950). There are, however, one or two recent exceptions to this.

the headman and elders as a means of settling disputes in the village, a statement supported by my observations.

A second piece of evidence points in the same direction. While in Blackrock, I was several times told that if a fight between lineages breaks out, then it is the immediate duty of neutral lineages to intervene, by force if necessary, in the cause of peace. This may be taken as indicating that feuding was as far as possible suppressed by the rest of the village, when the village indigenous political organization was still vigorous. Another factor which is likely to have been more serious in the less settled days, is the fighting between villages. This still sometimes occurs, but immediately it does so, the gendarmes are brought in, and the fighting stopped. Administrative action and summonses to court follow. Village solidarity against other villages is not now therefore a motive for preserving internal harmony, though very probably it was in the past.

It is, then, plausible to suppose that feuding was kept in check by the strength of indigenous authority within semi-autonomous villages, — that elders not concerned in the quarrel often had enough power to enforce a settlement, aided by the recognized need for solidarity against other villages. If this is true, then, paradoxically, the first results of more efficient control by government of the villages has been, through a decline in the strength of the indigenous political control, an increase in deaths from feuding. The truth or falsity of this hypothesis would be extremely hard to establish beyond doubt.

But quite apart from this historical conjecture, it remains a fact that at present Turkish village feuds know no formal indigenous procedure for compensation or peace-making, as far as I can discover. Among a people who habitually go armed, who are quick to resent insult, and for some of whom at least quarrelling may serve to maintain the coherence and even enhance the prestige of their lineages, this leads to a considerable amount of violence. Up to date, the comparative light sentences given by the courts has certainly made State action against feuding ineffective.

The purpose of this article has been mainly descriptive. But it does, I think, also leave us with the large question, how so uncontrolled a system of feuding can exist at all in such small communities, and whether the commonly accepted 'functional'

explanations of the control of feuding within small communities are adequate.

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THE TRANSITION FROM SERF TO PEASANT IN EASTERN EUROPE[1]

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During the first part of the nineteenth century, the great majority of the populations of the Russian and Austro-Hungarian empires lived under servile conditions. They lived in the countryside, tilled the soil, and were bound by law to the land which they worked in personal subjection to the landlord. A small proportion lived in urban places and worked in ateliers in a similar state of personal subjection to the owner of the atelier. Those who lived in rural conditions were dependent on their crops for subsistence, and marketed the lesser share of their harvests; hence, money played a minor role in their economy. These serfs were changed in status into another type of peasantry during the middle of the century, as the result of legal reforms and social and economic changes of a radical nature. It will be our task to comprehend the changing structure of peasant society in Eastern Europe within the context of the changing social, legal and economic relations of the time.

The relationship of the peasant to the city as a market for his labor and his produce is a central factor in the differentiation of the serf of the past from the peasant of today. The Mediterranean peasant, notably in Italy and Southern France, has had a close relationship to the city over a longer period of time than in Eastern Europe, where the serf was changed into a peasant later. In Eastern Europe this relation is largely a phenomenon of the past hundred years. Most recently, the peasant of Turkey has developed a closer relation to the city. In Asia the traditional peasant-urban relationship is more limited in scope; however, such terms as serfdom do not apply to traditional Asia.

The city, the great urban market, and the money economy have come to play a great role in the life of the peasant. At this point a distinction must be made. A local town market is quite

different in its impact on peasant practices and relations from the city. The relation to the large urban communities is transforming the life of the peasants. The changing relation to the city is, in fact, the mark of change in the current period of peasant life over the world.

In Eastern Europe, the peasant preponderates in the life of the society and imposes a stamp on all facets of national life; the entire society is peasant in character, with its component peasant communities. In Western Europe the peasants live in small communities, enclaved in a larger society whose fundamental impress is urban and industrial. In both the fundamentally urban and the peasant societies or nations, the relationship of the city to the peasant village has come to play a decisive role. This changing relation in Eastern Europe is of recent origin; it occurred during the nineteenth century, when the servile status came to an end in this part of the world. With these contextual considerations in mind, we may consider the Eastern European peasant society during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries down to World War II.

During the course of this discussion, the terms serf, peasant and farmer will be distinguished. The farmer is an independent producer, equal in status and mobility to all other parts of the society, closely tied to the urban market for his produce and with a high degree of capitalization of his production relative to that of the peasant. The term serf has already been defined. The term peasant designates a tiller of the soil in general, whose economy has a low degree of capitalization, significantly less than that of the farmer, and whose social and economic relationships to the world outside his community are few and poorly developed. The peasant lives in relative isolation from the communications net of the larger society in which his community is established. The peasant community is thrown more upon its own resources in running its affairs. The urban community in a peasant society has a small proportion of the population relative to the whole; in a peasant society, the peasantry dominates numerically. Finally, that the peasant is lacking in mobility is a conception which will be more precisely developed in the following pages.

Eastern Europe has been comprised of a series of preponderantly agrarian societies each with a minor urban segment. The agrarian sector of the society was composed of communities of

cultivators who were spatially and socially immobile. The urban
sector is mobile in social status and comprises within it a part
of the peasantry which has opted for urban life. Spatial mo-
bility is at the disposal of the peasantry as a potential to be rea-
lized; in moving to the city the peasant enters into that sector
of the society which is mobile. While the peasant remained on
the land his social status was fixed.

The concept of the peasant then is one of being socially fixed
when and only when he is spatially fixed, and socially mobile
when he has moved away from the village. This concept has
several aspects. There is a legal aspect: the peasant has no *de
jure* bond which ties him to his holding. In this regard the
peasant is distinct from the serf. There is a psychological aspect:
the peasant has the decisive power to move, which he may seize
upon or not. There is a moral-philosophical aspect in the choice
of the novel versus the traditional way of life. There is an eco-
nomic aspect: the urban market which constantly expanded
its demands for peasant-born labor and for peasant products;
there was also an over-seas market for the peasant labor and
product.

The economic aspect in turn relates to broad trends in urban
development: above all, the transformation of the city from a
center of distribution to a center of manufacture with increasing
demands for peasant labor. In Russia in the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries the development of industry was engendered
in urban centers whose traditional economic role was primarily
distributional.

The peasant is conceived as fixed in place socially and spatially;
to this extent he is unfree. It is necessary to recall that freedom
is not a monopoly of the cities, that the peasant has certain areas
of freedom in regulating the internal life of his community, a
right which he loses in moving to the city. The self-regulating
function of slum areas of the city — where the peasant moved
— is notoriously small. The peasant gave up much of his free-
dom in moving to the city, exchanging one type of unfreedom
for another, and one type of freedom for another.

Demographic Criteria of Peasantry

The first point in regard to peasant societies, their preponder-
antly agrarian and rural character, can be put in terms of num-

bers. As such, the problem is at once a democratic as well as a demographic problem, because the politics of peasant societies is directed from the cities. During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, certain nations are considered to be characteristically peasant in composition and economic production. During the nineteen-thirties, Rumania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria were peasant countries, countries with high proportions of the population living in rural habitats and high proportions dependent on agriculture for livelihood. The populations of those countries were between 79 per cent and 87 per cent rural: four or more out of every five lived on the land. We distinguish between rural and agricultural population: at this time, those dependent on agriculture in these three countries were about 75 per cent of the total population: three out of every five made their living off the land. The Baltic countries, Lithuania, Latvia, Esthonia, had a slightly lower rural to urban ratio during the nineteen-thirties: about 70 per cent, ranging between 66 and 77 per cent rural in composition.

By way of contrast, Czechoslovakia was 34 per cent rural during the same period, Greece was 50 per cent, Hungary 52 per cent, and Poland 63 per cent. By this criterion alone, Czechoslovakia cannot be considered a peasant country, nor would anyone seriously advance the claim that it is: it has a lower rural composition than Italy (43 per cent); at the same time it is higher than France (28 per cent), Germany (21 per cent), or Denmark (32 per cent).

As a general trend, 95 per cent of the rural population in peasant countries is dependent on agriculture. The extent of this dependence will be examined below.

At one extreme stood Rumania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and two of the Baltic countries, Lithuania and Esthonia. In these countries, 70 per cent of the population or more was dependent on agriculture and rural in habitat. At the other extreme stood such countries as Czechoslovakia, the most highly industrialized of the Slavic countries. It is true that Czechoslovakia is more properly Middle European in political and economic geography. In its economy, the eastern part of the country, Slovakia, conforms more closely to Hungary and Poland in composition and dominant economy, while the Czech area is more nearly like industrial Germany. Hungary and Greece have a position mid-

way between the two extremes; in these countries, the rural population is slightly over half of the total; Latvia and Poland were slightly over 60 per cent agricultural during that period.

That these relationships are not static is best illustrated by the Russian example. At the end of the nineteenth century the Russian empire had one of the highest rural-to-urban ratios in the history of modern civilization. According to the census of 1897, Russia was composed of 87 per cent (later recalculated to 88.5 per cent) rural inhabitants, or seven rural out of every eight persons. In 1926, Russia, then emerging from the period of revolution and civil war, was little changed in composition: 82.1 per cent of the population was classified as rural. Through the industrialization of the nineteen-thirties, the absolute number and relative weight of the rural population declined; yet in 1939 the Soviet Union was still a predominantly rural country despite the economic changes: 67.1 per cent of the population, or two out of every three persons were rural in habitat. According to an estimate in 1956, the Soviet Union had a proportion of 56.6 per cent rural population; well over half of the population lived in the countryside. In the Russian part of the Soviet Union, that is, European Russia and Siberia, excluding the Baltic states, Belo-Russia, the Ukraine, the Caucasus, and Central Asia, the rural proportion is significantly lower, 51.8 per cent. Here the urbanization and industrialization have proceeded at a faster rate than elsewhere in the Soviet realm.[2]

By contrast, Rumania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria continued to report proportions of population in excess of 75 per cent rural in 1948. While it is true that the definition of urban and rural differs in the various countries, the ratios and percentages which would result from uniform reporting and analytic techniques would not be significantly different in these various countries. Since 1948, the Balkans have changed rapidly toward urbanization, and at present have no more than five in eight or two in three rural inhabitants.

Peasant in Relation to the City

The second point in regard to the structural definition of the peasantry concerns the city. The urban center in a peasant coun-

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[2] The Soviet Census of January 1959 has indicated a rural rate ot 52 per cent.

try functions as a market for agricultural products and as the entrepot for transshipment to the industrial, food-importing countries. The urban centers of Eastern Europe also have served as the point to which peasants have moved from the land, and through which they have moved to the New World. From the middle of the nineteenth century down to World War II, the Eastern European peasant has been relatively free to move. It is this characteristic of free movement from the land which serves as the second effective criterion of peasant societies. The cities play a joint role as commodity and labor market, and as entrepot for the transshipment of goods and people to other countries.

The peasant relation to the city is not a passive one of supply. The peasant brings a number of peasant institutions, above all, those involved in handicraft production, to the urban community of the peasant society. The peasant stamp is to this extent marked on the city.

The peasant community is in large measure isolated, but its members as such are not bound to the soil. The peasant, whether of his own volition or under the impetus of land and labor agents, under conditions of demographic and economic pressure, political unrest and social change, has moved in vast numbers. Despite the transformations undergone by Europe during the past century, however, the peasant societies have remained what they were at the beginning of the period, peasant societies. There has been no marked industrialization to provide an urban magnet drawing off the agricultural population in these countries. There has been a steady trickle to the cities in the peasant countries, while the great migration has taken place beyond the borders. The peasants had a choice before them, to go or to stay. There is little research done on the factors which have induced the peasants to remain on the land, however much the dynamisms of their movement to Warsaw and Chicago have been studied.

Peasant Migration and Movement

To the extent that the peasant has moved from the land he has ceased to be a peasant. In the move to other parts of the world, he has become an urban inhabitant, or remaining rural, a farmer. It is true on the other hand, that a number of peasant cultures have been transplanted to French Canada, to Siberia, and to parts of Latin America. The Siberian peasant was to some

extent a farmer. A great role in the settling of Siberia was played by the State peasants; these peasant-farmers were directly under the State rather than under private landowners; crown peasants were similar to State peasants as opposed to the serfs. State and crown peasants had considerably more freedom of movement than serfs.

The peasant has become socially mobile by virtue of a new spatial mobility: in each case, it is the changing relation to the city and to the market which accounts for the transformation. Where the peasant has moved and has remained a peasant, we find an unchanging relation to the land, to the church, and to the city. On the other hand, the city to which and through which the peasant has moved has afforded him opportunities for social movement inaccessible to him while he remained in his rural habitat and agricultural occupation. For, while he remains spatially immobile he continues to remain socially immobile. It is the characteristic of peasant communities to maintain a rigid social structure: nobility, large landowners, gentry on the one side, peasantry on the other.

The peasant knows that there exists an open universe outside his village. It is his decision to move which makes the open society accessible to himself. It would be interesting to know the degree to which the consideration of the rigidity of social structure in the peasant village is important in the decision to move. Weighing against the move is the consideration of the unknown. Weighing in favor of the move are the new job opportunities and/or the legend of the golden land; the immediate experiences of land hunger; the precedent of those who have gone before; the inducements of land and labor agents, and the possibility of movement for the first time in memory or story. Conflicts within the village and within the family were resolved by migration. At this time, all that is needed is the decision to move. The presence of the choice, its option or rejection, is a structural criterion of the peasantry.

The differentiation of peasant from serf may be established *de jure* in the right of free movement. During the nineteenth century, not all Eastern European cultivators were peasants. At the beginning of that century, few agricultural communities had the option of movement: perhaps the most striking instances of peasant community migrations at that time are those of the dis-

senting religious sects and the state and crown peasants. Aside from these, movements of individuals or groups took place, and involved large numbers of people; however, these were movements of limited term. In eighteenth and nineteenth century Russia, up to the emancipation of the serfs during the eighteen-sixties, the landowner, *pomeshchik,* held the serfs who worked the land in legal bondage. At this time, a money economy was but weakly developed, and the payment of dues by the serf to his landlord usually took the form of payment in agricultural produce and in labor. It was possible for a small number of serfs to accumulate a sum of money and, by payment to the landlord, gain the right to engage in manufacturing, trade, and moneylending either in the village or in the city. The peasant due in money (at times in kind, but not in labor) is termed *obrok* in Russian. No permanent change in legal status accompanied this payment; the qualified freedom that it brought was dependent on its continuation, and could be abrogated at will by the landowner (*pomeshchik*). The landlord was reluctant to do this as a rule because the enterprises of the moneyed serf were sources of non-agricultural income in an era of relative scarcity of money; but up to the liberation, the *pomeshchik* had a unilateral right to denounce the agreement and to return the serf-entrepreneur to the soil. Russian serf enterprise took on its highest form through the *obrok* system. It gave rise to highly complex forms of production within the peasant society, contributing to the rise of the *kulak,* or serf capitalist.

During the same period, the Russian serf had another kind of mobility, the customary right of movement to the city for a season, or for a period during youth. Seasonal labor, especially from agricultural communities in the vicinity of large cities was a widespread phenomenon. Likewise, the movement of youth during the period prior to marriage was practiced, usually in order to accumulate capital necessary to begin married life in the home village. Neither of these movements, nor any related ones (movements for a purpose rather than a period, movements of groups rather than individuals) had a permanent effect on the rural-urban relations or population distribution, nor on the fundamentally agricultural economy of Russia of the time. Put in a corollary manner, the seasonal or other term-movements of serfs could not be absorbed by the cities; they could not be made

permanent migrations because there was no fundamental change
in the urban life and economy of the time which could absorb
them. At the end of the agreed term, a season, a year, or a num-
ber of years, the individuals or groups returned to the land.

Peasant and Market

The third point in the analysis of the peasantry involves the
role of the market and of money. The importance of money and
the growing market economy during the nineteenth century has
been alluded to in connection with the formation of the peasantry
of Eastern Europe. Regarded in terms of broad eras of develop-
ment covering centuries, the introduction of a money economy
and the market into the rural parts of agricultural countries is
correlative with the emergence of a peasantry. In Eastern Eu-
rope, during the latter part of the nineteenth century, the role
of money and of the market economy achieved increasing im-
portance. During the first half of the twentieth century, slightly
less than half the peasant product in Eastern Europe was mar-
keted as cash crops, or the cash part of the crop, and slightly
over half the crop was retained for subsistence. This was far
from being a uniform development throughout Eastern Europe.
Thus, the Albanians and Montenegrins had only a tangential
relation to the process of market information in this period, for
they marketed insignificant proportions of their produce; the
mountaineers were the last to be absorbed in the broad historical
trends. Raymond Firth has defined the peasant economy in
terms of the preponderance of the subsistence sector of the prod-
uct over the cash sector. His observation illustrates one aspect
of the peasant society in general, the market relation.

The market in this case is a means for maintaining the flow
of rural products to the city at a time when there is an increasing
demand for these products. The market development is at the
same time correlated with the increasing demand for labor, and
hence with the movement of manpower as well as goods from
the countryside to the city. The transformation of the Eastern
European cultivator from serf to peasant in the nineteenth cen-
tury involved a change in the pattern of formation and rate of
development of market relations; it also involved a number of
other legal and economic changes. The Hungarian cultivator

was a serf until the middle of the nineteenth century, bound to the soil, subject to the tithe and the *corvée* on the estate of the lord. The legal system of the Austro-Hungarian empire governed his status and kept him from either spatial or social movement. The Bulgarian cultivator was held in place not so much by a legal status as by an intricate system of indebtedness, a debt bondage which rendered him less free than the Russian serf who was, on the other hand, more sharply restricted in legal status. The religious aspect of the question, namely, the relation of an Orthodox Bulgarian tiller in an Islamic empire is not germane to the discussion because the Islamic cultivator, the *raia*, had a similar legal and economic position. Both the Islamic and the Christian cultivator had the same recourse of transforming the family estate into a religious endowment (*wakf*) in order to secure inheritance within the family, while making the estate subject to religious rather than secular dues, and at the same time relinquishing a part of the rights of ownership, e.g., the right of sale

Corporate Peasant Groups

The last feature that will be discussed is the role of corporate bodies in peasant life. Thus far, only problems of economic functions and social-legal status of individuals have been considered, at the expense of problems of the corporate life of peasant communities and associations. The peasant community organization of Eastern Europe is marked by the existence of corporate bodies. These corporations have been known from earlier epochs, prior to the period of serfdom or the formation of the peasantry as such. The house community (*zadruga*) of the Serbs and Croats has continued down to the twentieth century. The village community has been reported among central Russian peasants of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries; there it bears the name of *mir*. The village community is reported among the medieval Southern Slavs, although it is not prominent in recent centuries. Both the house community and village community, *zadruga* and *mir*, are corporate groups; both are perpetual associations, surviving incumbent memberships. They are closed bodies, with rules of membership, a locus of authority, and a distinctive mode of organization which bears an autonomy of function within a larger sovereignty.

In Russia, there existed yet another kind of corporation, which maintained a closer bond to the city and the market economy, such as it was, than the *mir* maintained. This corporate unity is the *artel*. The *artel* is a corporative enterprise, both urban and rural; however, because of the overwhelming proportion of peasants in traditional Russian society, it was predominantly rural. The enterprise took many forms: cooperation among individual households in a village (e.g., in the manufacture of clothing and household utensils), the organization of an entire village in an enterprise (e.g., lumbering), and even cooperation among groups of villages. Alternatively an *artel* was often formed by individuals acting as individuals together with others, and not as members of households. Urban manufacture during the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries in Russia often was an *artel* enterprise where it was not a state or magnate-run enterprise. The *artel* is a corporation in the same sense as the *mir* and the *zadruga*. The *artel* has provided the basis for the conception of the collective farm in the law of the Soviet Union today. Whether the collective farm is a corporation constitutes a formidable question in extension of corporate theory. The *artel* was the association in traditional rural Russia whereby the non-agricultural, and much of the agricultural product, was marketed.

The *artel* is related to the *obrok* system which acted as a prior, enabling institution. The *artel* is a system of handicraft production which presupposes a money economy, however limited the circulation of money may be. The *obrok* established the basis for peasant enterprises of which the *artel* was the most complex form.

The peasantry of any given nation has few types of corporate structures characteristically. It is only where the *zadruga* proliferates and becomes coterminous with a village that it becomes a village community; but this is only a formal identification. Some of the chief characteristics of the Russian village community are not found in the Yugoslavian peasant community: for example, the central Russian *mir* is a repartitional village; the village land was divided in strips and periodically redistributed among the village households. Neither the *artel* nor any close analogue is found to any significant degree among the Southern Slavs.

The *zadruga* is an involuntary association, for membership in it is established only by birth or adoption. The *mir* is only to a slight extent a voluntary association: for the most part, membership is established by right of birth. The *artel,* on the other hand, is as much a voluntary association as a modern business corporation. It is established for a purpose, yet it is not freed from the body of tradition or the social structure of Russian peasantdom. A villager might join a fishing *artel* of his village, or he might not, depending on other choices and alternatives before him. But recruiting for the village fishing *artel* rarely went on beyond the village limits. Typologically, the *zadruga* conforms to the simplest or most primitive corporative body, the *mir* is slightly more complex in structure, the *artel* is the most complex and is a halfway house in the emergence of the idea of the modern corporation. Similarly, the degree of division of labor is more highly developed in peasant communities of the *mir* and *artel* type than it is in the *zadruga.*

By way of contrast with the city, the peasant community has a paucity of types of corporate associations, a paucity that is correlative with the degree of division of labor. The peasant community has a low level of development of the specialization of labor as measured by the distribution of economic function, or its organization, in comparison with urban communities generally. Corporate enterprises exist in peasant communities, but they generally operate through the village social structure and their product is almost never diversified. Correlative with the low level of work organization of the village as compared with the city is the low level of technological development.

Conclusion

The peasant communities in Eastern Europe in the post-serfdom period have been characterized by their relations to the urban community, first within their society, second to the world beyond. The relations have taken the form of a profound cleavage in attitudes, beliefs, sentiments at the same time in which a unity in economic, political and legal systems has been developed. The urban development in Eastern Europe has been related to urban development elsewhere in the world in respect to ideas and art. The peasantry lives at considerable remove from contact with

them. Political movements in countries where they form the vast majority have acted upon the peasants, not with them or through them. Economic policies have acted to the detriment of the peasants: they have been entrapped by economic trends which place a greater value and higher price on urban than rural production.

The peasantry has changed during the period since World War I. The Eastern European peasant came into the present era with a low level of technology relative to that of the city, with primitive conceptions of economic organizations, ill-expressed ideas of rationalization of production and distribution, and a scope of political consciousness which did not extend far beyond the village. The relation of the peasant to the soil, to the village, and to the nation have changed during the past generation. Trends within these lines of development since World War I have been extensions of those begun a generation ago. The relations of the village to the city have changed; the impetus to change has emanated from the city. During the past decade, policies conceived in the cities have had to take into account the increasing amount of actual and potential resistance of the peasantry, resistance both active and passive. The Communist regimes of the past decade no less than the monarchist and republican regimes of the inter-bellum period have had to face the realities of peasant unrest. The most recent recognition of this political factor has been the modification of the collectivization program in the Soviet Union, releasing production in private peasant plots on collective farms from an obligatory state levy; Poland and Yugoslavia have in part retrenched in the program of collectivization, and in part abandoned it.

The peasantry as a social formation is characterized by a rural economy, chiefly agricultural; a rigid hierarchy in the village; the alternative of migration either to the city or to another country, with the possibility of social mobility in either case; a demographic preponderance in their own country; the dependence on agricultural production for the major share of the subsistence; and the allocation of a large but minor share of the agricultural product to the urban market. The peasant household and village community have somewhat shifted their position as the units of production as well as of consumption, a position maintained by serf societies; the corporate structures of the peasant community

play a major role in peasant non-farm production and marketing. Technological development, specialization of economic function, and rationalization of economic organization are all poorly developed in peasant life, both in farm and non-farm production. Social organization is relatively simple, and overlaps to a large degree with work organization. All these measures are relative to the technological, organizational level of urban social and economic life within the peasant society.

One of our tasks has been to show how the distributional pattern in the peasant economy as pointed up by Firth is related to the demographic pattern and a changing legal pattern. The large if minor role of the urban market is part of a dynamic trend: the role of the urban market and the money economy is increasing. The demographic pattern is shifting: the urban proportion in the total population of the peasant societies is increasing at the expense of the rural; these will not be peasant societies much longer. The migration to the city by way of permanent residence was begun in Eastern Europe with the abolition of serfdom. This migration is now being accelerated. Already it has included Turkey in its dynamism.

The Eastern European peasant has a recent past of serfdom, and a sharp cleavage from the city in sentiments. Increasing contact with the city had made firmer the bond between the rural and urban sectors of the society, and heightened the consciousness of difference. The cleavage has been expressed in social action during the period of ever closer contact with the city. At this time, the role of money, the urban market, urban and national politics, have become increasingly prominent in the rural life of the peasant countries, especially in Eastern Europe. The nation has become a key political symbol.

During the past century the city has changed its role in peasant life in Eastern Europe. The past century has been the period of emergent industrial development in that part of the world. The flow of goods and of labor from the countryside to the city, and from the city to the outside world has developed in this period in a manner different in degree and in kind from the past, pre-peasant era. The changing role of the city has assisted at the transition of the tiller from serf to peasant status. Access to a mobility of social status has been made available to the tiller by his peasant condition.

With industrialization the peasant condition is contracting from its former predominant role in the economy of Eastern Europe. What new forms will emerge remain to be shown. Contrasted with other major peasantries, the Eastern European peasantry during the past decade has been the most closely involved in urban development of all. The increasing involvement of the Eastern European peasant with urban and national problems is the mark of the end of peasant isolation over the world.

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NEWS AND NOTES

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